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[T]he notion of direct participation in administrative governance responds to
deep strains of individualism and political egalitarianism in the American
character. It rekindles the nostalgic image of the town meeting.1
America has a paradoxical bureaucracy unlike that found in almost any
other advanced nation. The paradox is the existence in one set of institutions
of two qualities ordinarily quite separate: the multiplication of rules and the
opportunity for access.
2
The new participation may actually be creating a new influence structure
which selective interests, already administratively active, have exploited in
hope of greater success; one might well expect the agency-group relations to
stabilize within the structure over time without necessarily producing any
strong pressures for greater heterogeneity of representation.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law has somewhat of a fetish for public participation in
agency decisionmaking. Over the last thirty years or so, courts,4 Congress,5
* Assistant Professor and Dore Professor of State Administrative Law, Florida State University
College of Law, email jrossi@law.fsu.edu; LL.M., 1994, Yale Law School; J.D., 1991, University of
Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Fred Bosselman, Larry George, Steve Gey, Sanford Greenberg, Adam
Hirsch, Charles Koch, Hal Krent, Ron Levin, Randy May, Mark Seidenfeld, Sid Shapiro, Lois Shepherd,
and Peter Strauss for comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to Florida State University Col-
lege of Law for providing summer research funding.
I JERRY L. MASHAw, DUE PRocEss IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 23 (1985).
2 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENTs Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 377
(1989).
3 Walter A. Rosenbaum, The Paradoxes of Public Participation, 8 ADMIN. & SOC. 355, 374
(1976).
4 Cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (noting that the public interest includes consideration of
aesthetic, conservation, and recreational needs, and that the Federal Power Commission alone could not
protect these interests).
5 The earliest modem experiments with mass participation in administrative decisionmaking took
place in the antipoverty programs of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. See, eg., Demonstra-
tion Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (1966); Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964). Many environmental statutes passed
during the 1970s and 1980s also contained significant enhanced opportunities for participation in agency
decisionmaking. See, eg., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1994) (allowing public participation in preparation of Environmental Impact Statements); Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (allowing for oral legislative-type hearings); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (1994). Although the use of mass participation in agency deci-
sionmaking is a fairly recent phenomenon, bureaucracy has always provided for some degree of public
participation. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, conducting a case study
of rulemaking over fifty years ago, concluded that five basic forms of participation in mlemaking were
in widespread use by the close of the 1930s: oral or written communication and consultation, investiga-
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and scholars6 have elevated participation to a sacrosanct status. For exam-
ple, recent reform efforts are consistently geared to enhance broad-based
participation in the agency decisionmaling process.7 Greater participation
is generally viewed as contributing to the democracy, and also to the qual-
ity, of decisions by otherwise out-of-touch bureaucrats.8 Yet participation,
tions, specially summoned conferences, advisory committees, and informal and formal hearings.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. No. 77-8, at 103 (1941). See also infra notes 21-22,131 and accom-
panying text (discussing participation during the Jacksonian era).
6 See Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PMTT. L.
REv. 423, 426-33 (1996); Ernest Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81
YALE L.J. 359, 361-62 (1972).
7 Federal reform proposals have consistently contained enhanced opportunities for broad-based
participation. See, eg., Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§ 202, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (adopting reforms designed "to make agencies more responsive to small
business"); see also S. 343, 104th Cong. § 625 (1995) (sponsored by Senator Dole) (proposing addi-
tional public participation in regulatory analysis by allowing persons subject to major rules to petition
the relevant agency or President for cost-benefit analysis and subjecting denial of such petitions to re-
newed judicial review). But see S. 981, 105th Cong. § 623 (1997) (sponsored by Senators Thompson
and Levin) (proposing substantially less onerous cost-benefit assessment requirements than the Dole
bill). In addition, many states have experimented with proparticipatory reforms. In Florida, for example,
the state legislature adopted a major APA reform bill in 1996 designed to facilitate increased participa-
tion in agency decisionmaking, including negotiated rulemaking and more opportunities for the public to
challenge rules before they are final. See 1996 FLA. LAWS ch. 96-159 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §
120 (West Supp. 1997)). For discussion of Florida's recent Administrative Procedure Act (APA) re-
forms, see Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Rulemaking Revolu-
tion or Counter-Revolution?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1997). North Carolina has also recently adopted
many pro-participatory reforms, including a Rules Review Commission, consisting of eight citizens,
which has veto power over proposed agency rules. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.12(d) (1995).
8 This literature is far too vast to reproduce in full here. See, eg., Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS) Recommendation No. 76-1, Public Participation in Administrative Hearings,
1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 ("persons whose interests or views are relevant and are not otherwise represented
should be allowed to participate in agency proceedings whether or not they have a direct economic or
personal interest"); ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING 7 (1972) (noting that 'ass participation may be one of the ma-
jor innovative forces in developing new issues and refining old issues that have remained on the formal
agenda for some time"); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participa-
tion in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. LJ. 525 (1972) (stating that lack of public participation is a
major factor in agencies' failure to develop regulatory policy responses to public needs); Frank Fischer,
Citizen Participation and the Democratization of Policy Expertise: From Theoretical Inquiry to Practi-
cal Cases, 26 POL'Y SCI. 165, 181-82 (1993) (noting that participatory policy analysis by bureaucrats is
"more than a utopian concept' and holds promise for solving problems of expert decisionmaking); Gell-
horn, supra note 6 (advocating increased participation in bureaucratic decisionmaking); Stuart Langton,
Citizen Participation in America: Current Reflections on the State of the Art, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
IN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF THE ART 1, 7 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978) (noting that citizen
participation serves a "watchdog" function, helping to improve agency decisionmaking); see also
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 105-11 (1970) (noting that evidence of
political unawareness and lack of interest in issues are indicative of deficiencies in institutions, not of
limitations inherent in individuals).
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like citizenship and many other untouchables of modem democracy, has
rarely been defined, explored, or criticized.9
Interestingly, in other important activities of life, participation does not
enjoy this sacred status, nor is participation itself indicative of the quality of
the practice. Consider, for example, participation in art. Performance art-
ists enact a ceremony that affirms shared values with an audience. Ener-
getic and enthusiastic spectators, some conversant with the rules of
performance and its underlying meaning, might be said to participate as ob-
servers. 10 In most instances, though, the demarcation between performer
and audience is clear.
In recent years, however, advocates of community theater and amateur
music have urged mass participation as a way to smash the elitist distinction
between performer and spectator." But while participation in the creation
of art may be personally and socially satisfying, no one would suggest that
it tells us much about the quality of art. Likewise, it just does not make
sense to evaluate the quality of a sports event, such as a baseball game, by
the sheer number of spectators in attendance or viewers tuned to the televi-
sion channel. Nor is the number of players or performers indicative of the
quality of a game or a show: "We might just as well assess the future of
American music by counting the number of amateur musicians. 12
9 But see THEODORE J. LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 86-87 (1969) (criticizing participatory programs for "cut[ting] out that part of the
mass that is not specifically organized around values strongly salient to the goals of the program");
GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 362-63 (1966) (observing that the
participatory politics facilitated by interest groups must be mediated by government); DANIEL P.
MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON
POVERTY 159-61 (1969) (explaining problems with "maximum feasible participation" in welfare pro-
grams); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLICAL DEMOCRACY AND
SOCIAL EQUALITY 341-42 (1972) (suggesting that nonelectoral participation skews policy in favor of
particular participants and away from the "public interest").
10 Cf Edward L. Schieffelin, Performance and the Cultural Construction of Reality, 12 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 707 (1985).
1I One author notes that 15% of students in U.S. schools engage in regular musical performance
activities, even though a very small number of these students will pursue music professionally. Bennett
Reimer, Is Musical Performance Worth Saving?, 95 ARTS EDUC. POL'Y REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 2-5.
According to Christopher Lasch, who analogizes political participation to participation in competitive
sports,
[Tihe critics of "passive" spectatorship wish to enlist sport in the service of healthy physical exer-
cise, subduing or eliminating the element of fantasy, make-believe, and play acting that has always
been associated with games. The demand for greater participation, like the distrust of competition,
seems to originate in a fear that unconscious impulses and fantasies will overwhelm us if we allow
them expression.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING
EXPECTATIONS 108 (1979).
12 Id. at 108,n.*.
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While it would be sophomoric to suggest that democracy, like serious
music or baseball, 13 ought to be left to the professionals, political theorists
have often suggested that mass participation is not always a positive good
for democracy. Plato suggested that some elite-not the masses-should
govern because of its monopoly on certain skills conducive to collective
judgment.1 4 And, in the twentieth century, political commentators ranging
in ideology from Jose Ortega y Gasset to Walter Lippman 16 to Hannah
Arendt17 have expressed ambivalence about unfettered participation of the
masses in democratic decisionmaking. These theorists perceive mass par-
ticipation as a threat to democracy, because the masses-the People-may
be under- or mis-informed, lost, bewildered, overly self-interested, or sim-
ply apathetic.' 8 Indeed, recent public attitudes about Congress reaffirm this
perception: Congress, the most public and directly participatory institution
in our government, is also one of the most disliked institutions of govern-
ment.19
If participation raises problems for democracy, it is certain to raise
problems for contemporary democracy's veritable "fourth branch"-
administrative agencies. For example, as public participation in agency
decisions has increased over the past thirty years, citizens have expressed
less, not more, confidence in government. Bureaucrats are perceived today
in popular culture as out-of-touch, staid, and lackluster.20 Perhaps, as oppor-
13 Democracy is a distinctive practice insofar as it is concerned not only with the enjoyment, in-
spiration, and education of a state's citizens, but also with producing results which are coercive to non-
participants and mediating conflict that is predefined, external to the rules of the game. The connection
between sports, music, and democracy has been made before in the legal literature. See, ag., Lani
Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. I (noting that modem electoral democracy is de-
scriptively like a classic American spectator sport, baseball, but should strive to be more like another
distinctively American activity, jazz music). Modem efforts to analogize legal institutions to music are
not new. See Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 1259 (1947).
14 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 233-34 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., W.W. Norton
Co., Inc., 1985).
is JOSt ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 116"(W.W. Norton Co., Inc., 1964)
("When the mass acts on its own, it does so in only one way, for it has no other., it lynches. It is not al-
together by chance that lynch law comes from America, for America is, in a fashion, the paradise of the
masses.").
16 WALTER LIPPMAN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 143-45 (1925) (suggesting that mass participatory
democracy fosters a timid conformity to prevailing public opinion).
17 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 460-79 (1951) (discussing how mass
participation, by fostering isolation and loneliness, creates preconditions for totalitarian domination).
IS See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 166 (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1989)
("Serious involvement with culture produces facility, while the consumption of mass culture leaves no
lasting trace; it affords a kind of experience which is not cumulative but regressive.") (footnote omitted).
19 See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARDS AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 148-49 (1995).
20 See, e.g., PHILIP HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994).
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tunities for access have increased, citizens over the years have had more di-
rect experience with what has always been there-ineffective bureauc-
racy.
21
On the other hand, the increase in mass participation itself may have
adversely affected the quality of bureaucratic decisionmaking.22 In this Ar-
ticle, I explore the mechanisms by which participation reveals itself in
modem bureaucratic democracy. After introducing participation's values
and its contribution to various political-theoretic models of agency deci-
sionmaking, this Article examines a particular cost of mass participa-
tion-its negative spillover effects on another political ideal,
deliberation-and explores this cost in the context of administrative law. I
argue that mass participation, while sometimes beneficial to agency legiti-
macy, may in certain circumstances impair deliberation, which many con-
temporary administrative theorists perceive as an equally important
function of administrative law. A threshold amount of participation is nec-
essary to deliberative decisions, but at some point participation creates sig-
nificant institutional costs for deliberative administrative process. As a
result, the ideals of democratic governance may suffer.
Part I of the Article briefly explores traditional rationales for increasing
participation in agency decisionmaking. Participation helps to avoid domi-
nation of the political process by factions; it also minimizes many informa-
tion problems inherent to agency decisionmaking. In addition, participation
is often embraced as a political ideal because it treats citizens fairly by al-
lowing opportunities for input, it educates citizens, and it reaffims citizen-
ship. Administrative agencies provide for both passive and active forms of
participation, in a variety of direct and representative ways. In addition to
the classic agency mechanism for facilitating citizen participation, namely
notice and comment rulemaking,24 other mechanisms for facilitating mass
21 In fact, it should come as no surprise that, prior to the growth of mass participation in bureauc-
racy in the 1960s, efforts to increase participation in agency decisionmaking corresponded with a
deterioration in the perceived status of agencies. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY
IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1829-1861, at 329-32 (1954) (discussing the decline in the perceived
status of agencies that accompanied rotation during the Jacksonian era).
22 Cf. MASHAW, supra note 1, at 29 ("Participation has costs as well as benefits."). This too is
not inconsistent with experiences in previous eras. See WHITE, supra note 21, at 327-29, 332-43 (dis-
cussing the effects of increased participation facilitated by rotation on efficiency and accountability
during the Jacksonian era).
2 "Mass" participation is used to describe unregulated, indiscriminate participation before
agency decisionmakers that treats all persons, entities, or organizations with claims to interest equally.
It contrasts with regulated participation, which discriminates among different claims to interest and does
not allow all claims to interest equal standing to participate before an agency. I also use the term to
contrast participation facilitated by nonbureaucratic political institutions, such as the legislative or ex-
ecutive branches, discussed infra note 46. Mass participation includes both "direct" and "representa-
tive" (or "crypto-mass") forms of participation, discussed infra notes 109-28 and accompanying text,
although it contrasts with regulated or mediated representation.
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (agencies must "give interested parties an opportunity to participate
in rulemaking through the submission of written data, views, or arguments"); see also CORNELIUS M.
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participation in administrative procedure include initiatives, public surveys,
open meetings and public records, negotiated rulemaking, site-specific dis-
pute mediation, citizens' review panels, and advisory commissions.' 5
In Part H of the Article, I briefly present various political-theoretic
models that have been used to describe agency decisionmaking. I then ex-
plore the purposes of participation in the context of each model. Experto-
cratic models view the decision process primarily as an exercise in
scientific validation by virtue of the method and culture of the agency ex-
perts' profession. A second model, pluralism, views decisions as residual
conflict resolution akin to market exchange. A third model, deliberative
democracy, has arisen in recent years as an alternative to these expertise
and pluralist models. In contrast to the older models, deliberative democ-
racy views agency decisions as providing both for participation and for de-
liberation as primary, irreducible values.
Part III of this Article explores a tension between participation and de-
liberation, brought to the fore of administrative law by deliberative democ-
racy. When things work well, the ideals of participation and deliberation
converge; the optimal mix of participation and deliberation will ensure
breadth as well as depth and focus in agency decisions. Like many ideals in
law, however, participation and deliberation often clash. When the ideals
produce conflicting demands on decisionmakers or participants, there is a
trade-off between participation and deliberation: increased participation
comes only at the cost of diminished deliberation. After discussing the ex-
istence of the tension and presenting an initial framework for its examina-
tion, I explore mass participation in three contexts: citizen suits to enforce
federal environmental laws, the preparation of Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), and the operation of the Government in the Sunshine Act (Sun-
shine Act).26
While threshold levels of participation often improve the quality of
agency decisions, participation can-and often does-adversely affect "or-
dinary" agency decisionmaking in three ways.27 First, it may, and often
does in the context of citizen suits, impair agency agenda setting at the cost
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (1994). A re-
cent study of interest group participation in agency rulemaking concluded that "[m]any interest groups
surveyed characterized participation in rule making as important as participation in legislation." Scott
R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rulemaking, 29 ADMIN. & Soc. 325, 341 (1997).
25 For an excellent survey of many of these mechanisms, see Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Partici-
pation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUFS
226 (1990).
26 While each of these examples illustrates how participation, if not appropriately structured, can
have deleterious effects on agency governance, my purpose in exploring these examples is not to suggest
that one or more of them is inherently flawed.
27 "Ordinary" decisionmaldng, as I describe it below, refers to the day-to-day, instrumental op-
eration of agency decisionmaking within a given structural model and its specified goals. See infra
notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
92:173 (1997)
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of neutral analysis and accountability to democratic political processes.
Second, it may, and sometimes has in the context of the EIS process, create
information problems for decisionmakers and participants, encouraging use
of strategic tactics, such as delay, that thwart the development of agency
programs and the achievement of regulatory goals. And third, as has often
been observed in the context of open meeting laws, it may impair collegial-
ity and chill deliberation in multimember agencies. Moreover, I suggest,
increased participation creates incentives for an agency to make a funda-
mental shift in its decisionmaking culture, away from deliberative demo-
cratic decisionmaking and towards expertocratic or pluralist models. To the
extent that deliberative democratic ideals are important to agency decision-
making, mass participation may make their pursuit impractical.
Part IV analogizes the tension between participation and deliberation in
administrative law to a problem that has been recognized in other areas of
the law. Recent civil procedure and First Amendment scholars have recog-
nized a similar tension and have proposed a move away from participation
and towards selective and limited representation in the judicial or political
process. Similarly, I conclude that the tension between participation and
deliberation in administrative law is not likely to subside until the issue of
representation in the administrative process has been addressed.
The administrative process is ensconced in participation. Yet para-
doxically, idealizing, embracing, and expanding broad-based participation
may make institutions less, not more, democratic.28 The purpose of this
Article, though, is not to suggest that participation in administrative process
is an unnecessary luxury and that experts should have a monopoly over
agency governance. Nor is it to suggest that those individuals and groups
that currently lack access to administrative process be shut out. Rather, I
conclude that a study of participation's institutional effects on agency gov-
ernance offers a clear choice for administrative law: mass participation must
be balanced with deliberative values, or theories of deliberative democracy
in bureaucratic decisionmaking must be reassessed.
II. PARTICIPATION AND ITS VALUE TO AGENCY DECISIONMAKING
Participation is sacrosanct to modern democracy. Many evaluate the
quality of democratic processes, including agency decisionmaking, with re-
spect to the degree of participation provided.29 Like citizenship, participa-
28 This Article thus complements Philip Pettit's cogent effort to develop a republican conception
of freedom as non-domination, one that contrasts with his views of negative (non-interference) and
positive (pro-participatory) liberty. PHILIP PETTtT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT 7-11 (1997). Pettit sees participation as "essential" to his vision of republicanism (what I
refer to in this Article as "deliberative democracy"), but not as a right or its independent attractions. In-
stead, for Pettit, participation is valued "because it is necessary for promoting enjoyment of freedom as
non-domination." Id. at 8.
29 See supra notes 6, 8.
HeinOnline  -- 92 Nw. U. L. Rev.  180 1997-1998
Participation Run Amok
tion is considered tantamount to democracy and democratic processes.
Rarely has it been questioned, criticized, or explored.30
But the history of administration is replete with examples of failed re-
forms adopted with the noble intention of increasing access to administra-
tive agencies. Consider the Consumer Product Safety Commission's
(CPSC) experience with rulemaking in the 1970s. The original Consumer
Product Safety Act (CPSA),31 passed in 1972, contained a number of provi-
sions designed to "maximize public participation" 32-- increasing the
CPSC's responsiveness to concerns and information from external sources.
Two provisions of the original CPSA were of particular significance for
participation.
Under section 10 of the original CPSA,33 any person could petition the
CPSC for a rule setting product safety standards. Following receipt of a
petition, the CPSC was required to respond within 120 days.3 If the CPSC
granted a petition, it was required to initiate a rulemaking process with an
oral hearing. 35 If the CPSC decided to deny a petition for a rule, it was re-
quired to publish its reasons for doing so in the Federal Register, and this
decision would be subject to review by a trial de novo in a district court.36
Once the rulemaking process was under way, an additional opportunity
for external influence-known as the "offeror process"--was provided by
section 7 of the original CPSA.37 Whenever the CPSC proposed to initiate
a rulemaking proceeding to establish product safety standards, it was re-
quired to invite persons or groups outside the agency, including consumer
and industry groups, to develop the product standard.38  If an offeror pre-
sented a standard, the CPSC was required to give the offeror the assign-
ment, provided that the agency determined it was competent to develop the
30 See the works cited supra note 9; see also MASHAW, supra note 1; LESTER W. MILBRATH,
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: HOW AND WHY Do PEOPLE GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS (1965); Rosen-
baum, supra note 3.
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994).
32 H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, at 14 (1972).
33 Law of Oct. 27, 1972, § 10, 86 Stat. 1217 (repealed 1981).
34 See id.
35 See id
36 See id. The participatory rights afforded by section 10 were much broader than those allowed
interested persons under the APA. Under the APA, interested persons can petition an agency for the is-
suance, repeal, or amendment of rules, but are only entitled to "prompt notice" of the petition's denial
and "a brief statement of the grounds for denial"; judicial review under the APA is not de novo, but
subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(e), 706(2) (1994).
37 For a detailed description of the original CPSA offeror process, see Antonin Scalia & Frank
Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973);
Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer
Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32 (1982); Carl Tobias, Early Alternative Dispute Resolution in a
Federal Administrative Agency Context: Experimentation with the Offeror Process at the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (1987).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (amended 1981).
92:173 (1997)
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standard. 9 The standards developed by designated offerors could not be
modified by the agency except through a full rulemaking process, which in-
cluded another offeror process.40
As Jerry Mashaw describes the CPSC experience with rulemaking in
the 1970s, "[t]he progressive logic of participation" became "the progres-
sive logic of disaster. 41 The effect of the participatory processes provided
by sections 7 and 10 was to bury the CPSC in an "unproductive investiga-
tion of useless subjects and [to] destroy[] its capacity to set a reasonable
agenda for regulation."42 The offeror process, designed to allow direct par-
ticipation by regulated interests, produced debilitating delay and made the
CPSC virtually captive to the very industries it was designed to regulate.43
In response to this disaster, in 1981 Congress repealed sections 7 and 10 of
the CPSA.44 As the CPSA example illustrates, participation's value to
agency decisionmaking must be understood with respect to other activities
that contribute to democratic legitimacy, not as a sacred, paramount value.
A. Rationales for Mass Participation in Agency Decisions
Standard justifications for broad-based involvement in agency deci-
sions regard participation as serving purposes of accountability and over-
sight, minimizing the potential for capture of the process, and counteracting
myopia by improving information available to agency decisionmakers and
citizens. Citizen involvement in agency decisions also reinforces proce-
duralist goals and helps to create and affirm citizenship.
1. Increased Accountability and Oversight.-Administrative agency
decisions are subject to formal institutional oversight by Congress and
courts-for the latter, though, not until an agency has taken "final" action.45
However, immediate participation in the decisionmaking process before an
agency takes action also serves as a type of informal oversight, ensuring
that the agency is accountable to the public at large for its decisions.
The oversight and accountability rationale is paramount to the legiti-
macy of agency decisions. Agencies occupy an odd place in our constitu-
tional structure, somewhere between the legislative and executive branches.
39 See id,
40 See id. See also Scalia & Goodman, supra note 37, at 908.
41 MASHAW, supra note 1,at 262.
42 Id. at 262-63; see also Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Vol.
4, 94th Cong. 170 (1976) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Hearings]; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT B-139319: THE CPSC NEEDS TO ISSUE SAFETY STANDARDS FASTER (Dec. 12,1977).
43 See generally Schwartz, supra note 37, at 62-68; R. David Pittle, The Restricted Regulator, 12
TRIAL 24-30 (May 1976); see also Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 42, at 35.
44 See Consumer Product Safety Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1210, 95 Stat.
703.
45 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
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However, at least in the federal system, agencies are not directly account-
able to the political processes that are responsive to participation in elec-
toral politics. In other words, agencies lack any direct link to majoritarian
political processes.
While administrative agencies are subject to institutional oversight by
majoritarian branches, such as the executive branch and Congress, 6 and
nonmajoritarian branches, such as courts, suchformal oversight is imperfect
to the extent that these institutions have scarce resources and are generally
reactive rather than proactive with respect to agency action a7 In addition,
nonagency political institutions may be subject to coordination problems of
their own.4s
Participation in the immediate administrative process reduces the ne-
cessity of and occasion for nonbureaucratic institutional oversight. Ac-
cording to one author, "[p]ublic participation has deterred the agencies from
straying too far from their assigned missions."4 9 Judge Jerome Frank of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged Con-
gress's interest in designating "private attorneys general" to assist in en-
forcing laws by participating before an agency or obtaining judicial review
of agency action.50 In the past, the Supreme Court has recognized the im-
portance of this function in its liberal agency standing jurisprudence.1
46 Nonbureaucratic political institutions, such as the legislative or executive branches, may also
foster increased participation in bureaucratic decisionmaking. For instance, one rationale for separation
of powers is that it broadens participation beyond traditional direct participants in a single branch's gov-
ernance and makes accountability to citizens not solely dependent upon electoral year politics. See, eg.,
Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253
(1988). For example, the rotation system, introduced during the reign of President Andrew Jackson,
discussed infra note 131, had the effect of increasing participation through the channel of the executive
branch.
Many recent administrative law reforms also have had the effect of increasing participation by in-
volving the legislature, which would be directly responsive to participatory pressure outside of an
agency's decisionmaking process. For example, the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996
delays the effective date of agency rules and shifts the decisionmaking process to Congress, which may
then pass a joint resolution declaring that it "disapproves the rule... and such rule shall have no force or
effect." Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 802, 110 Stat. 847 (Mar. 29, 1996). For discussion of this process, see
Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 95
(1997). Discussion of the nonbureaucratic participation facilitated by separation of powers is beyond
the scope of my analysis.
47 Cf. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,433 (1989).
48 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (1994) (arguing that increased political oversight over the last twelve years, resulting
from infighting between the legislative and executive branches, has reduced the discretion of adminis-
trative agencies without more democracy or better regulatory policy).
49 Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA.
L. REV. 253,263 (1986).
" See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,704 (2d Cir. 1943).
51 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,740 n.15 (1972) ("Once this standing is established,
the party may assert the interests of the general public in support of his claim for equitable relief.").
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The "private attorneys general" rationale encourages individuals who
are injured by agency action to assert the interests common to members of a
larger class.5 Since agencies are subject to immediate participation on such
grounds in many cases, agencies will face stronger incentives to comply
with congressional and judicial requirements, resulting in "enhanced agency
compliance with mandates and prohibitions Congress included in statutes to
protect the interests of groups that seek judicial review of agency actions in-
frequently because of collective action problems. 53 The result is better ac-
countability and oversight of agency decisions.5 4
2. Minimizing Excessive Concentration of Power.-Participation may
also help to reduce the likelihood of the administrative process yielding
monopoly rents for interest groups. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison
decried the potential of factions-special interest groups who are not neces-
sarily majorities-to dominate government decisions.5  The potential for
factional domination of a decision is particularly large when each member
of a small group has a large stake in the decision's outcome, while each
member of a larger group has a relatively small stake in the decision's out-
come.5 6 Factional domination, or "capture," of bureaucratic decisionmak-
ing has been well documented5 7
In the past two-and-a-half decades, through standing jurisprudence,
courts have attempted to mitigate factional domination by infusing the deci-
sionmaking process with a greater degree of participation. Under previous
Supreme Court standing jurisprudence, regulated firms themselves were
52 As an illustration, imagine that an agency action, such as approval of a proposal to build a
high-voltage electricity transmission line, has the actual or perceived potential to cause injury to a large
group of people, such as members of a minority group or all people who use a park for recreation or en-
joyment. Members of the minority group or individual users of the park are unlikely to participate in
opposing this decision unless their preferences in opposition are relatively strong. The fact that there are
multiple individuals with similar interests creates incentives for free-riding because as each individual
perceives that others may be similarly affected by the agency action, the likelihood that any member of
the class will devote resources to asserting the class's interest is greatly reduced. See MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65 (1965).
53 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 68
(1994).
54 However, private attorneys general alone will rarely suffice to completely overcome the free-
rider problem. Ultimately, what would be needed is a system that taxes all regulatory program benefici-
aries to pay individuals who bring actions. To the extent that private attorneys general can recover fees
from a company or other entity which, then, could pass these on to other customers or similarly situated
individuals, a system that taxes a regulatory program's beneficiaries may work to internalize some of
these costs.
5s See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51-52 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1889).
56 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213
(1976); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3, 11-12
(1971).
57 See, e.g., Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1684-87 (1975).
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often the only parties with standing.58 Other affected persons, such as con-
sumers, were rarely allowed to participate in agency decisions.59 Even
when beneficiaries could participate before an agency, often beneficiaries
did not have a group on the agency's staff who viewed them as constituents,
nor did the agency have much other incentive to react to the beneficiaries'
perspective, since beneficiaries typically could not challenge an agency's
decision on appeal. This disparity in procedure and status created the po-
tential for factional domination of agency decisionmaking processes by in-
terest groups who could use the political process to extract monopoly rents.
The Supreme Court's liberalization of administrative law standing doctrine
beginning in 197060 allowed participation by interests in conflict with those
of regulated firms, forcing agencies to become aware of and consider a
broader range of perspectives. 61  Although it is unclear whether this doc-
trinal revolution has sufficiently controlled private capture of decision-
making, it has helped to disperse the power of the strongest, most vocal
interest groups, historically dominant in the decisionmaking process.
3. Better Quality Information for Decisionmakers and Citizen Partici-
pants.-Because information often exhibits many of the qualities of a public
good,62 the private market frequently fails to provide adequate amounts of
information.63 The positive effects of more information on the quality of
agency decisions are threefold: first, as information makes its way inside
the bureaucratic process to the actual decisionmakers, it contributes to the
rationality of the final decision by improving the information base utilized
in setting agendas, developing alternatives, and making final policy deci-
sions; second, additional information about agency proposals fosters public
understanding of and support for agency proposals; third, as participants
58 See, eg., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (holding only those who have suf-
fered a "legal injury" have standing to sue); Hohn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970) (tenants not
entitled to obtain individual review of Federal Housing Administrative decisions to grant rent increases).
S9 Former Federal Trade Commissioner Mary Gardner Jones, for instance, once stated:
At the moment under the Commission's law enforcement obligations, it is compelled by due proc-
ess to listen and take account of the viewpoints of those industries and persons which are subject to
its regulations. No such compulsion exists for the Commission to listen and take account of the
viewpoints of other members of the public who may be injured by the Commission's failure to act
or by ineffective action in its past.
Observations by Outgoing FTC Member Mary Gardner Jones on the Outlook for the Federal Trade
Commission, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 636, at D-3 (Oct. 30, 1973).
60 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
61 See Gellhom, supra note 6, at 362 (participation "can serve as a safety valve allowing inter-
ested persons and groups to express their views before policies are announced and implemented").
62 A public good is an item that is freely available to the public without the possibility of exclu-
sion.
63 See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility ofInformationally Effi-
cient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
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exchange information among themselves they are more likely to become
aware of others' perspectives, helping to forge understanding and consen-
sus.
Through participation, agencies learn of the preferences of affected
citizens, as well as about policy alternatives and the actual and anticipated
effects of their actions.64 Participation begets better information for the
agency decisionmaking process, and at the same time, encourages the deci-
sionmaker to "really listen" to what the participant believes is important and
not accept conflicting evidence or arguments without close scrutiny.65
While agency decisionmaking is regarded by many as more than mere pref-
erence aggregation, 66 participation provides decisionmakers with informa-
tion as affected citizens reveal their preferences.
Participation provides other, less preference-dependent information as
well. Most would expect government decisionmakers, when pondering dif-
ficult issues, to gather as much information as they can before reaching a
decision. Indeed, often government is criticized for acting too soon or for
not having enough information.67 By facilitating consideration of more in-
terests and viewpoints to be heard, participation broadens the range of is-
sues before an agency. 8 Similarly, by increasing the number of points of
access, participation makes it more Xrobable that information will be heard
and considered by decisionmakers. To the extent that rational decision-
making will yield a single "correct" result as in determining whether an in-
dividual is entitled to a welfare benefit under predetermined guidelines,
64 Cf. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 132-33 (1930) ("[The people
must educate their rulers. At least they must see to it that their rulers are educated for the tasks of gov-
ernment.").
65 JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 140 (1983).
66 See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text (discussing the expertocratic model); infra
notes 163-85 and accompanying text (discussing deliberative democracy).
67 For example, it has been argued that the management of renewable resources, such as forests,
focuses on a narrow range of economic values, excluding information regarding noncomnodity values,
such as protection ofbiodiversity, watershed functions, and carbon sequestration. See ROBERT REPETTO
ET AL., WASTING ASSETS: NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS (1989).
61 See Robert G. Healy & William Ascher, Knowledge in the Policy Process: Incorporating New
Environmental Infonnation in Natural Resources Policy Making, 28 POL'Y SCI. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that
"better understanding of the multiple functions of ecosystems will lead to more attention to balanced
conservation as a concern of public policy and to more support among policymakers for conservation");
see also Peter Isaacson, Pollutant Regulation and Public Sensibility, 6 ENVTL. IMPACr ASSESSMENT
REV. 229-32 (1986) (observing that the public sees problems, issues, and solutions that the experts
miss).
69 As Professor Kerwin notes:
Agencies rely on the public for much of the information they need to formulate rules. Therefore, if
participation is hampered by hostility, intransigence, secrecy, or incompetence on the part of the
agency, the rule will be deprived of information that is crucial to establishing its authority with the
affected community.
KERWIN, supra note 24, at 162.
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participation enhances the likelihood that the agency will reach a correct
decision and minimizes the probability of decisionmaking errors.70  But,
even in contexts where a single correct result is unlikely, participation may
give decisionmakers valuable information. Lay judgment of risks, for ex-
ample, may be as sound as or more so than experts', who may be loath to
recognize certain harms or to question the fundamental assumptions of their
models. Members of the public, rather than experts, may be in a better
position for "institutionalizing regret" 7 -- for mediating uncertainty through
a reasoning process and correcting errors over time.7
Participation does not only educate agency decisionmakers; it also
educates citizens with respect to policy issues. Through participation, citi-
zens learn about agency proposals before an agency has made its final deci-
sion.74 This helps the agency in rationalizing its decision and in facilitating
the exercise of "reflexive" preferences by citizens, who may be influenced
by the availability of new information. Thus, in addition to ensuring more
agency responsiveness to citizen preferences and objective evidence, par-
ticipation also allows decisionmakers to persuade-to affect and mold the
preferences of the public.75 Participation may also facilitate the exchange
of information between participants, contributing to their understanding of
different viewpoints and the possible formation of consensus.
4. Proceduralist Values.-Persons and entities subject to agency
regulations are more likely to view agency decisions as legitimate if the
procedures leading to their formulation provide for fair consideration of
their views.76 According to Mashaw, for example, participation by claim-
70 See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 102-03.
71 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 88 (1995) (arguing that risk managers should not only be attentive to the number of lives saved,
but also "to public judgements about the contexts in which risks are incurred, and hence to the full range
of factors that make risks tolerable or intolerable").
72 BENJAMiN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE
258-59 (1984).
73 For example, had decisionmakers relied solely on diagnostic and preventive experts, risks such
as DES and Agent Orange would have been missed. See Peter Brown, Popular Epi demiology: ommu-
nity Response to Waste-Induced Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 78-
85(1987).
74 See Gellhom, supra note 6, at 361 (participation "can ease the enforcement of administrative
programs relying upon public cooperation'). But see Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, Procedural Jus-
tice and Regulatory Compliance, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 83 (1996) (observing that, although control
over decisions is correlated with compliance with a regulatory program, subjective procedural justice
measures do not significantly predict compliance).
75 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, INQUIRY & CHANGE: THE TROUBLED ATTEMPT TO
UNDERSTAN & SHAPE SOCIETY (1990). As a matter of political theory, this role of participation is
controversial but underexplored.
76 See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 121 (1975) (greater consideration of individualized arguments enhances perceptions of pro-
cedural fairness); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
92:173 (1997)
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ants in Social Security Agency decisions serves the cognitive purpose of
producing "an understanding on the claimant's part of the substantive adju-
dicatory norms and of the decision process. Participation "inspires con-
fidence that sufficient efforts have been made to inform the decisionmaker
about the claimant's case.",7 8  It has been observed that, especially under
conditions of scarcity, where participating in private economic markets is
unlikely to provide ample satisfactions and opportunities, participation in
political processes offers the only hope for protecting substantive rights and
for stabilizing democratic values and institutions.79 Thus, participation may
serve to reaffirm the procedural values that lie at the core of democratic in-
stitutions.8°
5. Breeding Citizenship.-Finally, participation in agency decision-
making may help to produce better citizens by inspiring a sense of civic re-
sponsibility. Participation not only makes for better informed citizens, it
also helps develop citizenship, a precondition to some contemporary theo-
ries of agency decisionmaking.81 Participation is important, Judith Shklar
has argued, because it is an "affirmation of belonging. 82 It makes citizens
feel as if they are a part of, and thus helps to encourage membership in, a
political community. Participation "educates individuals how to think pub-
licly as citizens,, 83 inducing "us to listen to other people's positions and to
justify our own.",84 Citizenship presupposes that one is able to participate in
the decisions that affect oneself and one's community.85
JuSTICE 208 (1988) ("Procedures are viewed as fairer when they vest process control or voice in those
affected by a decision.").
7 MASHAW, supra note 65, at 140.
78 See id.; see also Gellhom, supra note 6, at 361 ('If agency hearings were to become readily
available to public participation, confidence in the performance of government institutions and in the
fairness of administrative hearings might be measurably enhanced.").
79 In contexts where it makes sense to discuss substantive rights, participation is often valued?
because the exercise of positive liberty is seen as a way of protecting negative liberties. See PE=rrr, su-
pra note 28, at 30; see also Aryeh Botwinick & Peter Bachrach, Democracy and Scarcity: Toward a
Theory of Participatory Democracy, 4 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 361 (1983).
80 At the same time, it has been noted that participation may numb the public's faith in demo-
cratic processes, or lead the public to perceive such processes as failures. See HIBBING & THEISS-
MORSE, supra note 19, at 17-20, 60-61; see also Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public De-
liberation, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1634 (1985) (observing that the residents of the Tacoma, Washington,
area expressed hostility when Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator William Ruckel-
haus attempted to involve them directly in the decisionmaking process regarding arsenic content con-
trols on a copper smelter).
81 See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (discussing civic virtue).
82 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 25-26 (1991).
83 BARBER, supra note 72, at 152.
84 Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE
L.J. 1623, 1624 (1988); see also Hannah Fenichel Pitkdn, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9
POL. THEORY 327,347-49 (1981).
" See PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE 26 (1967).
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B. Participation in Agency Decisionmaking
Given the diversity and cumulative persuasiveness of the above ra-
tionales in favor of participation and the emphasis modem political theory
places on enhancing positive liberty,86 it should not be surprising that con-
temporary administrative agencies provide for massive amounts of partici-
pation. Calls for greater public participation in agency decisions are likely
to continue as we confront a variety of new technologies promising easier
access to participation in and information about governance, such as Inter-
net access to xublic documents, 7 electronic town meetings,88 and electronic
rulemakings. In this section I briefly introduce some forms and types of
participation in the context of three examples, which will be the subject of
more extended discussion later in the Article.
1. Passive and Active Forms of Participation.-Agency participation
occurs at two levels: by decisionmakers (those on the "inside" of the proc-
ess with formal government positions pursuant to legal authority or an
agency's internal structure), and by lay persons (those on the "outside" of a
political decisionmaking process, fenced out by a lack of legal authority to
make collective policy decisions).90 Internal agency decisionmakers may
participate as either career or politically accountable bureaucrats.9 Layper-
sons participate in agency decisionmaking in both passive and active forms,
sometimes as individual parties, but more often as members of interest
groups, corporations, and other firms.
86 See PETrrr, supra note 28, at 17-21 (urging a reformation of the distinction between negative
liberty, or non-interference, and positive or pro-participatory liberty, made famous in the twentieth cen-
tury by Issiah Berlin).
87 See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Nov. 29, 1997)
<http://thomas.loc.gov/> (online access to bills, comnmittee documents, and proceedings of the U.S.
House and Senate); U.S. Government Printing Office Web Site (visited Nov. 29, 1997)
<http'//www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/> (online access to General Printing Office (GPO) documents, in-
cluding the Federal Register).
88 See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
(1995) (discussing deliberative polling techniques facilitated through the usage of television). With vid-
eoconferencing, state governments are also allowing for increased participation in agency meetings. See
Does the Sun Shine in Cyberspace? Electronic Access and State Open Meeting Laws, 27 STATE & LOC.
GOV'T REV. 235 (1995).
89 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for example, has undertaken a pilot project,
called "RuleNet," that allows Interet participants in an NRC fire safety rulemaking proceeding "to
communicate both with the NRC and among themselves, with a view towards defining issues, eliminat-
ing misunderstanding, and finding areas of common ground.' See RuleNet Extended Vision Statement
(visited Nov. 29, 1997) <http'//nssc.llnl.gov/RuleNetVisionVisioncnts.html#Concept> (the main index
for the RuleNet project is at <http:I/nssc.llnl:80/RuleNet/> (visited Nov. 29, 1997)).
90 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 48 (1984).
91 An important distinction, crucial to my analysis, is between politically insulated decisionmak-
ers, such as career bureaucrats or experts accountable exclusively to the norms of their agencies and pro-
fessions, and politically appointed decisionmakers, accountable to formal political institutions.
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In bureaucracies, many forms of participation are passive, allowing the
public to participate by observing-but not directly influencing-agency
decisionmaking. Consider, for example, the Sunshine Act, 2 a post-
Watergate law founded on the principle that the "government should con-
duct the public's business in public." 93 The Sunshine Act's primary pur-
poses are to provide the public with information regarding the
decisionmaldng processes of federal agencies and to improve these proc-
esses by increased public oversight, "while protecting the rights of indi-
viduals and the ability of the Government to carry out its responsibilities."'
94
Most forms of bureaucratic decisionmaking, however, also allow the
public active participation in the agency decisions.95 For example, citizens,
either on their own or through interest groups, are allowed to petition agen-
cies to initiate rulemaking or participate directly in the rulemaking proc-
ess,96 as the CPSC example illustrates. Many agencies have broad
intervention guidelines, allowing the public to participate in adversarial
adjudicative disputes as well.97 Citizens also participate actively in agency
decisions through mediated decisionmaking, such as dispute resolution98 or
negotiated rulemaking. 99
Another example of an agency process allowing for active citizen par-
ticipation is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process under the
92 The Sunshine Act is codified in pertinent part at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994).
93 S. REP. No. 94-354, at I (1975). The Sunshine Act complemented previously enacted legisla-
tion designed to open the government's decisionmaking process to public participation, such as the
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994) (enacted in
1946), the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (enacted in 1966), and the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. at 1371 (1994) (enacted in 1972).
94 Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
95 The distinction between active and passive forms of participation is employed elsewhere in the
political participation literature. See MILBRATH, supra note 30, at 9.
96 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e) (1994) (requiring agencies to "give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule"), 553(c) (agencies must "give interested parties
an opportunity to participate in rulemaking through the submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments"); see also National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("Public participation in agency decisionmaking is increasingly recognized as a desirable objec-
tive.").
97 See, eag., 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1996) (NRC); 14 C.F.R § 302.15(b) (1996) (Department of
Transportation) (criteria for intervention "will be liberally interpreted'); 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(2)(ii)
(1996) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (identifying classes of interested persons, including
competitors).
98 See, e.g., Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1994); see also Civil Justice
Reform, Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 5, 1996) (directing agencies to utilize alter-
native dispute resolution in lieu of traditional adjudication, where appropriate).
99 See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994); see also Clare M. Ryan,
Regulatory Negotiation: Learning from Experiences at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in
MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONaLICTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 203 (J. Walton Blackburn & Willa
Marie Bruce eds., 1995).
HeinOnline  -- 92 Nw. U. L. Rev.  190 1997-1998
Participation Run Amok
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), °00 which has spawned massive
citizen input. NEPA declares a congressional purpose to "encourage pro-
ductive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to pro-
mote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man ."10' NEPA's proce-
dural requirements are contained in a single statutory section;102 under sec-
tion 102, all federal agencies, proposing actions that will significantly affect
the environment must prepare an EIS and make copies available to the pub-
lic. 03  Draft EISs are distributed to the public for written comments,"'
which generally must be made within forty-five days.05 An agency must
hold a hearing or meeting when (1) there is "substantial environmental
controversy concerning the proposed action or substantial interest in hold-
ing the hearing," (2) another agency with jurisdiction over the action re-
quests a hearing, or (3) another statute so requires.106 Once it has received
comments from the public and other agencies, the agency then revises its
draft EIS and prepares a final EIS. The final EIS must contain and respond
to all "responsible" opposing viewpoints. 107 Within thirty days after distri-
bution of the final EIS, an agency may make its decision, which is memori-
alized in its record of decision.'
°9
100 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
101 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). Unlike other detailed and highly complex environmental statutes,
such as the Clean Air Act, NEPA is surprisingly brief.
102 While early lower court cases were split on whether NEPA imposed any substantive stan-
dards on agencies, see, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139
(5th Cir. 1974) (noting split in the circuits), the Supreme Court has held that NEPA's requirements are
"essentially procedural." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
445 U.S. 519,558 (1978).
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994). Other than this general requirement of public disclosure,
NEPA provides no guidance as to what procedures should govern public participation in the preparation
of an EIS. Under the language of NEPA, the views of'Tederal, State, and local agencies" should ac-
company an EIS, but comments from ordinary citizens are not expressly contemplated. Id. NEPA did,
however, contain another provision that created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) as a part
of the Executive Office of the President. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1994). CEQ, nudged occasionally
by the judiciary, has established NEPA procedures. See, eg., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The current framework for participation under NEPA is
contained in revised regulations, published in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978) (codified at 40 C.FR.
pts. 1500-1517 (1996)).
104 See 40 C.F.R § 1502.19 (1996). Notice of the draft's availability is published in the Federal
Register, id. § 1506.10(a), and the agency must then send a copy of the draft EIS to any member of the
public who requests it. Id § 1502.19(c).
105 See id § 1506.10(c). The EPA may "for compelling reasons of national policy" provide for a
shortercommentperiod. Id. § 1506.10(d).
'o6 Id. § 1506.6(c).
107 Id. § 1502.9(b). This requirement was established in early case law. See Seaborg, 463 F.2d
at 787.
... 40 C.F.R. §§ 1505.2, 1506.10(b)(2) (1996). The record of decision is designed "to see that
the decisionmaker considers and pays attention to what the NEPA process has shown to be an environ-
mentally sensitive way of doing things." 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,985 (1978). It is required to state the
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2. Direct and Representative Participation in Agency Decisions.-
Participation in agency decisions is provided primarily by agencies
allowing "points of access" to their decisionmaking processes, expanding
opportunities for the public to provide information to agency
decisionmakers, and allowing access to information about agency
decisionmaking. Virtually every citizen participates to some degree in
agency decisions, whether through formal political institutions that oversee
agencies (for example, voting), indirectly as a member of an organization
which directly comments on agency proposals (for example, a corporation
or public interest group), or as an individual who is immediately affected by
agency action (for example, a social security claimant).
Yet, ever since James Madison, in Federalist No. 10, distinguished
between a "republic"--by which he meant "a government in which the
scheme of representation takes place"--and a "pure democracy"--by which
he meant a group of citizens who "assemble and administer the government
in person '  -Americans have debated whether, when, and how much to
directly participate in political institutions.10 As Madison recognized,
democratic political institutions provide for two main forms of participa-
tion. The first form--direct participation (pure democracy)-allows indi-
viduals themselves to directly voice their opinions and concerns. Voting
mechanisms such as referenda, in which citizens directly register their
opinions on social issues, and mass opinion polls are the closest modem-
day variants of direct democracy. However, as some have noted, participa-
tion can perhaps never really be direct, because individuals' opinions are
always filtered through voting ballots, which reflect a preselected range of
choices, congressional staff, majoritarian processes, or polling question-
naires.'1
The second form identified by Madison-representative participation
(a republic)-allows individuals to participate in political decisions indi-
rectly by their membership in organizations and institutions. Self-selected
groups or persons often stand for citizens in the political process. What
Bruce Ackerman has dubbed a "synecdoche"-one who "stands for" an-
agency's decision, identify the alternatives the agency considered, specify environmentally preferable
alternatives, discuss the factors that the agency balanced in making its decision, and indicate whether all
practical means of avoiding or minimizing environmental impacts were considered. 40 C.F.R. §
1505.2(a)-(c) (1996).
109 THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, at 56-57 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1889).
110 As the historian Edmund Morgan has recognized, notions of "representation" and "popular
sovereignty" are inherently fictitious. And, as with fiction, a willing suspension of disbelief may help us
to understand how they both sustain and limit government's authority. See EDMUND S. MORGAN,
INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13 (1988)
("Government requires make-believe .... Make believe that the people have a voice or make believe
that the representatives of the people are the people.").
I' See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 59 (1989).
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other-is a form of representation that occurs regularly in politics.112 In-
deed, some might argue that politics itself is a process that facilitates deci-
sions by a part that are to be taken to stand for, or represent, the whole.
Such is our status as members of churches, unions, public interest groups,
and citizens in congressional districts and states. Representative democracy
is widespread before administrative agencies to the extent that individuals
themselves do not appear before agencies, but instead participate by virtue
of their voluntary membership in interest groups, such as unions, environ-
mental organizations, corporations, or public interest groups.'
13
As Madison recognized, however, participation is not without its
costs. 114 While one cost of participation is interference with the agency de-
cisionmaking process,11 5 another cost, the cost to the individual, has been
observed to give rise to interest group participation. Participation has obvi-
ous costs for individuals, who may forgo participation in a political process
where it is perceived that individual action will not make a difference.
Frustrated by the costs that increased participation in institutions may create
for them, individuals, out of rational ignorance or apathy, may choose not to
participate in the political process. 1 6 Individuals are more likely to partici-
pate in political processes, including agency decisionmaking, where the ex-
pected benefits of participation exceed the costs. 17 Typically the costs of
direct individual participation in agency decisionmaking are very high, es-
pecially when generic issues of policy (for example, environmental protec-
tion, economic policy) are addressed." s Unless particular individuals are
112 BRUCEACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 181 (1991).
113 See Stewart, supra note 57, at 1667.
114 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1889) ("The
instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite
and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declarations.").
!15 See infra Part IV.
116 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260 (1956) ("[E]very ra-
tional man decides whether to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the returns outweigh the costs,
he votes; if not, he abstains:'). For a recent attempt to address Downs' voting paradox using social
norm theory, see Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996). For further
discussion of Downs' contributions, see the collection INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION & CHOICE: AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995).
117 One of the factors influencing an individual's decision to participate in a process is the extent
to which she believes that her participation will have some beneficial impact upon the outcome. Recent
research suggests that one's decision to participate in political processes is often a product of one's so-
cioeconomic status or one's resources. See Henry E. Brady et al, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of
Political Participation, 89(2) AM. POL. SC. REV. 271 (1995) (suggesting that time, money, and civic
skills are strong predictors of political participation).
118 It has been observed that
the more closely the matter touches on the personal life of an individual, the more likely the indi-
vidual is to take the effort to participate in the hearing process; conversely, the more general and
abstract the policy content, the less likely one is to find individual public participation.
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singled out as direct beneficiaries of a governmental decision, it is highly
unlikely that they will participate actively in agency decisionmaking.' 9
Because the costs of individualized participation in policy decision-
making are often excessive, informal representatives are prevalent as a form
of participation in agency decisions. Individuals are most likely to partici-
pate in agency decisions by virtue of their membership in interest groups,
whether "public interest" groups, unions, trade associations, corporations,
or firms. 1 0 Hence, when we refer to participation before administrative
agencies, we often speak of interest group representation.
1 21
Interest groups can also be understood as arising from an asymmetry of
information between more diffuse groups and more concentrated groups.
Narrowly focused and more concentrated groups have information and
transaction cost advantages in pursuing their political interests because they
suffer from fewer and less intense collective action problems.1 22 The solu-
tion to a variety of market failures and policy problems is based in promot-
ing the development and dissemination of information among participants,
as well as channeling that information to decisionmakers.' 2 Informal rep-
resentation through interest groups allows for more, not less, participation
in agency decisions to the extent that interest roups provide a mechanism
for filtering information and pooling resources. 
24
Michael D. Reagan & Victoria Lynn Fedor-Thurman, Public Participation: Reflection on the California
Energy Policy Experience, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 89, 95 (Jack DeSa-
rio & Stuart Langton eds., 1987).
119 My discussion, which focuses on agency policy decisions, recognizes that individualized
participation has an important role to play in the decisionmaking process, but it must be accorded differ-
ent weights in different contexts. Where decisionmakers have singled out a particular individual, as in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a case in which an individual's welfare payments were in jeop-
ardy, the value of individualized participation remains paramount.
120 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1511, 1530 (1992) (defending interest groups "because they consolidate people with common
private interests and backgrounds" and "streamline the input that the government receives but ensure
that the interests of diverse parties are represented."). John Kingdon observes that, in practice, an inter-
est groups' resource base does not necessarily ensure that group domination on the issues relevant to its
interests:
The American Medical Association, once enjoying the reputation of standing astride health policy,
saw the enactment, over their [sic] vigorous objections, of Medicare and then of a series of regu-
latory programs. The vaunted highway lobby, powerful as it was and still is, saw portions of the
interstate system stopped by environmentalists and freeway opponents.
KINGDON, supra note 90, at 56.
121 "Generally .... the lower the partisanship, ideological cast, and campaign visibility of the is-
sues in a policy domain, the greater the importance of interest groups." Id. at 49.
122 See OLSON, supra note 52; Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance be Bliss? Imperfect Information
as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917 (1990).
123 See HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 92-105 (1983).
124 See Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1530. It has been noted, for example, that political parties
reduce the transaction costs associated with, and thus encourage, political participation. Peter W. Wiel-
houwer & Brad Lockerbie, Party Contacting and Political Participation 1952-90, 38 AM. J. POL. SCL
211 (1994).
HeinOnline  -- 92 Nw. U. L. Rev.  194 1997-1998
Participation Run Amok
Consider, for example, interest group representation pursuant to "citi-
zen suit" provisions, which allow "any citizen" or "any person" to sue pri-
vate parties or agencies for noncompliance with a statute. 25 Agencies, such
as the EPA, face limited enforcement budgets and may not have accurate
and complete information about violations of environmental statutes and
regulations. Although the term "citizen suit" may invoke the image of a
concerned individual citizen who seeks to redress some local or neighbor-
hood environmental problem, this is rarely the case in the environmental
enforcement context: citizen suits are almost always brought by profes-
sional advocacy groups with national or regional organizational structures,
such as the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the National Resources De-
fense Council (NRDC), or the Atlantic States Legal Foundation.126 Few in-
dividual citizens have the expertise, resources, or incentive to monitor how
the EPA administers environmental statutes; environmental interest groups,
by contrast, are better positioned to do so. A portion of settlement awards
and attorney fee awards from citizen suits are typically returned to envi-
ronmental interest groups, which then use these resources to fund additional
litigation, scientific and policy research, lobbying, and education of their127
members and the public. Citizen suits seem desirable because they allow
the public to bring violations of environmental laws to the attention of the
EPA and allow the public an opportunity to participate in environmental en-
forcement.
128
125 In the environmental law context virtually every federal statute provides for citizen suits
against private polluters, the government, or both. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619
(1996); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1996); Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977,30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1996); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994);Act to Prevent
Pollution of Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994); Noise
Control Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994); Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994); Public Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1996); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).
A major federal environmental statute that does not contain a citizen suit provision is the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1996).
126 For example, claims filed by six national environmental groups accounted for 162 of the 214
notices of intent to sue filed under the Clean Water Act between January 1978 and April 1984. Michael
S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits Became an Entitle-
ment Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 107-08 (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
127 Id.
128 Consider the observations of Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger:
mo the extent that regulation serves "the people" rather than "the industry" or "the bureaucrats,"
it gains legitimacy. Conversely, it forfeits that legitimacy when it becomes captive to the will of
the industries or bureaucrats. From this perspective, private enforcement may be viewed as the ul-
timate legitimizing device, since it gives the effective power to initiate regulation back to the peo-
ple themselves.
Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citi-
zen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 843 (1985).
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Ill. PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL-THEORETIC MODELS
OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING
Participation in administrative decisions does not occur in a vacuum.
Rather, it occurs in the context of an agency culture, which, in large part, is
influenced by the model embraced by those who have structured an
agency's internal decisionmaking mechanisms. Selection of a decision-
making model can influence how an agency structures and allocates its re-
sources, including staff, and how it channels expertise. Moreover, as I
suggest in this Part, the choice of a model will influence how an agency
values and treats participation by the public.
A. Models ofAgency Decisionmaking
In the past fifty years, there have been several accounts of agency deci-
sionmaking 1 29 Expertocratic models define the quality of decisions with
respect to the method and culture of the agency's experts' profession, but
do not provide much explanation for how lay participation and expertise-
based decisionmaking are to coexist in bureaucratic democracy. Pluralist
models, which reduce decisions to conflict resolution, are based in a prefer-
ence exchange theory of bureaucratic democracy: participation in bureau-
cratic decisions is viewed as akin to participation in the market. More
recent models, borrowing from the civic republican revival in constitutional
history, have attempted to synthesize deliberation and participation into a
deliberative democratic process, which revives some of the virtues of ex-
pertocratic models without denying completely the importance of lay par-
ticipation.
1. Expertocratic Decisionmaking.-Expertocratic models of adminis-
trative law view deliberation by decisionmakers as dependent upon spe-
cialized technical training, skill, and judgment.1 30  Early models focused
129 While the decisionmaking models I identify, in some respects, mimic models of delegation
identified by others, suffice it to say that a complete analysis of the merit, scope, and importance of
delegation is beyond the scope of this Article. For two spirited, but diametrically opposed, discussions,
see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine) and Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
81, 99 (1985) ("Delegation to experts becomes a form of consensus building that, far from taking deci-
sions out of politics, seeks to give political choice a forum in which potential collective action can be
discovered and its benefits realized."). A fatal flaw in the nondelegation argument is that the judiciary is
"institutionally incapable of creating and applying a delegation doctrine." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Politi-
cal Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 393
(1987).
130 Mashaw writes:
By virtue of constant exposure to a single type of problem, as well as by selection of personnel
with specialized training, the administrative agency could bring to bear an expertise that generalist
courts and generalist legislatures could rarely hope to mateh. Although the agency may not have
the requisite scientific knowledge or technical expertise to effect final solutions at the inception of
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almost exclusively on skill and expertise alone as justifying bureaucracy's
claim to power,1 3 while more recent expertocratic models focus on "com-
prehensive rationality," a set of conditions conducive to a synoptic, thor-
ough decisionmaking process.
Modem expertocratic decisionmaking has been called synoptic or
comprehensive because of the high degree of synthesis or comprehension
required by the decisionmaker. 37 Under this approach, expert decision-
makers define a rational choice as (1) defining a policy problem, (2) clari-
fying goals, values, and objectives (ends) and prioritizing them, (3) listing
practical means, that is, policies, for achieving these ends, (4) investigating
the important consequences that would flow from each of the alternatives,
its operations, the expertise model of administration imagines that over time experience and re-
search will produce increasingly sound administrative judgements.
MASHAW, supra note 1, at 19; see also MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIErY 973-80 (Guenther Roth
& Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
131 Traces of the expertise model appear in some of the early writings of Felix Frankfurter pre-
ceding the New Deal, the era in which modem American bureaucracy was bom. Frankfurter distin-
guished between an "early democratic faith," which prevailed in the nineteenth century-in which
"[p]opular rule was expected to work miracles"--and more modem forms of democracy-in which de-
mocracy "is dependent upon knowledge and wisdom beyond all other forms of government."
FRANKFURTER, supra note 64, at 126-27. For Frankfurter, writing in an era of rising Italian fascism, the
answer to defects with modem democracy was not the abandonment of the democratic ideal. Rather,
Frankfurter embraced Great Britain's Civil Service, created in the mid-nineteenth century, as a model of
democracy from which the United States could learn: "[A} highly trained and disinterested permanent
service, charged with the task of administering the broad policies formulated by Parliament and of put-
ting at the disposal of government that ascertainable body of knowledge on which the choice of policies
must be based." Id. at 145. Frankfurter rejected the political rotation system embraced by Andrew
Jackson during his presidency. He believed that Jackson '"practiced rotation in office because he thought
permanence makes for 'corruption in some and in others a perversion of correct feelings and princi-
ples."' Id. at 148 (citing Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 449). Because of this,
Frankfurter urged governance by bureaucrats with "training and a sophisticated judgment":
"[G]ovemment must have at its disposal the resources of training and capacity equipped to understand
and deal with the complicated issues to which... technological forces give rise." Id. at 150-51.
Frankfurter's model of trained, rational bureaucrats has won out over a competing model-Jackson's
model of rotating political officers-as the predominant contemporary rationale for delegation to ad-
ministrative agencies in the United States. See WHITE, supra note 21, at 4-5 (noting that Jackson did not
introduce the spoils system but continued a system of rotation which existed hand-in-hand with execu-
tive-branch-led participatory democracy). Since the New Deal, administrative agencies have been estab-
lished because experts housed in agencies, more than legislators and their staffs, are able to evaluate
technical evidence, engage in scientific analysis, and make rational policy decisions. Recent efforts to
expand participation in bureaucratic decisionmaking have been compared with "previous surges of
democratic values during the Jacksonian and Progressive eras." Nelson M. Rosenbaum, Citizen Partici-
pation and Democratic Theory, in CMZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF THE
ART 43, 48 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978).
132 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 137-38 (1965) ("To adopt
the term [synoptic decisionmaking] is to assume that a problem is solved by understanding it. Under-
standing requires a comprehensiveness of information and analysis."); see also THOMAS 0. MCGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
10 (1991); Colin J. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 414
(1981).
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(5) comparing these alternatives, and (6) choosing the policy with conse-
quences most compatible with the chosen ends.
133
Although expertocratic decisionmaking provides for scientific ration-
ality, its major shortcoming is that many agency decisions are not purely
matters of scientific judgment that can be reduced to a concrete problem-
solving calculus, but are inherently infused with value judgments. 1 4 Issues
of risk assessment, for instance, are not simply a matter of discerning sci-
entific risks, but a matter of determining who should bear the risks or costs
of a policy choice. Consider, for example, an electric utility's proposal to
build a high-voltage electricity transmission line through a park adjacent to
a residential area. Neighboring residents whose children play in the park
may object in part on the grounds that the children may be exposed to elec-
tro-magnetic fields (EVFs) increasing their risk of cancer and other adverse
long-range health effects.1 3 The electric utility, by contrast, will likely as-
sert that there is no sound scientific evidence to support such claims. 3 6
Yet, although neighboring residents raise the EM issue, attempting to
clothe the issue in science, there are also other grounds-less technical-for
their objection: a loss in a clear view of the sky, a loss in trees which must
be removed to accommodate the transmission lines, a decline in their prop-
erty value, and concern that the neighborhood will become a future brown
field. To the extent that agency decisions involve competing values, deci-
sionmaking is political and must provide for and value some degree of
nonexpert participation if it is to make claims to legitimate governance.
2. Pluralism.-An alternative model focuses not on expertise but on
the ability of decisionmakers to solve residual conflict among the constitu-
ency they regulate. Pluralism' 3 -- a theory dominant throughout the 1960s
133 The model is described in CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 13 (1968).
134 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 47, 81 (1979); see also DONALD MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND
PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS (1994).
135 According to a government report, as of January 1994, fourteen studies had analyzed the as-
sociation between proximity to power lines and various types of childhood cancers. Of these, eight
showed positive associations between proximity to power lines and some form(s) of cancer(s). Four of
the studies showed a statistically significant association with leukemia. See NATIONAL INST. OF ENVL.
HEALTH SCIENCES AND U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT EMF: ELECTRIC
AND MAGNETIC FIELDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF ELECTRIC POWER 12 (1995); see also San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 940 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1996) (discussing evidence of
the impact of EMFs). For a conflicting account of the evidence, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
POSSIBLE HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO RESIDENTIAL ELECTRIC AND MAGNETIC FIELDS (1996)
(finding no conclusive evidence that EMFs cause cancer).
136 See, e.g., D.A. Savitz & D.P. Loomis, Magnetic Field Exposure in Relation to Leukemia and
Brain Cancer Mortality Among Electric Utility Workers, 14 AMER. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 123 (1995) (sug-
gesting that study subjects, exposed to EMFs, had a lower risk of dying from leukemia and brain cancer
than the general population).
137 Some refer to pluralist theories as "exchange perspectives." See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN
P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 7 (1995) ("Politics can be seen as aggregating individual prefer-
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and 1970s and, in many circles, still dominant today 38--provides an alter-
native model of decisionmaking.
For pluralists, "[tlhe common good amounts to an aggregation of indi-
vidual preferences."1  Likened to markets, in its most prevalent form, plu-
ralism uses the political process to distribute the benefits of regulation
according to the preexisting 40 preferences of its constituents.1 41 An alter-
native form of pluralism views competition among interest groups not as
mere preference aggregation, approximating the result of free markets, but
as the best means of approximating the public interest142 Pluralists see po-
litical participation much as market participation, primarily as providing a
forum for exchange and bargaining, with the goal of satisfying pre-existing,
exogenous preferences.
1 43
Consider the legislative process as a forum for addressing an environ-
mental problem, such as air pollution. Now a classic description of the fail-
ures of pluralist democracy is the 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act's
definition of the control technology that must be installed at new sources of
air pollution.144 This amendment to the Clean Air Act requires major new
sources of air pollution to install control technology reflecting "the best
ences into collective actions by some procedures of rational bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation,
and exchange.").
138 This can be confirmed by browsing virtually any issue of the Journal of Law & Economics,
the Journal of Legal Studies, Public Choice, or the Journal of Law, Economics & Organization.
139 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32-33
(1985).
140 Some use the term '"nonreflexive" to describe pluralist preference revelation. See Robert E.
Goodin, Democracy Preferences, and Paternalism, 26 POL'Y SCI. 229 (1993); see also Cass R. Sun-
stein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140 (1986) (distinguish-
ing second-order preferences, which are preferences about preferences, from first-order preferences,
which are direct and often short-term desires for particular objects).
141 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 288-89
(1965); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 13 (1991); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4,45-46 (1984); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975).
142 ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY V. CONTROL (1982);
ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24
(1967); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 512-16 (1951). The distinction between the
public choice or economic understanding of pluralism and this public interest or civic variant is made in
MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 112 (1988).
143 It is important to note that pluralism, unlike expert-based models, implies value skepticism.
In other words, all claims to knowledge are treated equally in the preference exchange process. See
ARYEH BOTWINICK, SKEPTICISM AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1990). For example, a recent attempt
to reach consensus in a pluralist regulatory process associated the success of the process with partici-
pants' satisfaction with the outcome and concluded "the most that federal agencies may be able to
achieve is an open airing and full consideration of all views within the constraints imposed by external
factors." GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESTORING THE EVERGLADES: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN FEDERAL EFFORTS 2 (Letter Report, Oct. 24,1995) (GAO/RCED-96-5).
144 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
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system of emission reduction which . . .has been adequately demon-
strated."'145 However, it has been observed, the pluralist legislative process
that led to this language was fraught with democratic failures.
14 6
For pluralist democracy, whatever its form, participation in legislative
processes is an unwieldy and imprecise mechanism for the distribution of
regulatory benefits. Although Congress may be able to reach broad agree-
ment on its type of regulatory approach, its size and committee structure
may render a detailed congressional approach to the problem difficult or
impossible. Interest groups may find administrative agencies more effec-
tive institutions for aggregating their preferences.147 The details of air pol-
lution regulation, along with many of its difficult policy questions, can be
addressed by an agency, such as the EPA, which operates under a broad
grant of delegated authority from Congress. Agencies may be compara-
tively more effective than legislators in meeting pluralist political objec-
tives. 148  Thus, many pluralists favor broad legislative delegation to
administrative agencies.
So conceived, however, pluralism raises two related problems. First,
as Thomas McGarity has observed, 149 pluralism in bureaucracy may occur
145 42 U.S.C. 74 § Il l(a)(1) (1994). In addition, the 1977 amendments created the "Prevention
of Significant Deterioration" program that aims to prevent the deterioration of air quality in those parts
of the country that already comply with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7471-
7479 (1994).
14 First, the new statutory language, by requiring the control technology that would result in a
certain "percentage reduction" in emissions, forced scrubbing only indirectly, rather than addressing
head-on the means of pollution prevention. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 144, at 40,47-48. Sec-
ond, the opaque language adopted by Congress prevented public debate on the issues raised by forced
scrubbing. See id. at 55-56. Third, even the limited debate that a pluralist clash of opposing interests
may normally inspire was thwarted by a bizarre coalition of environmentalists and the eastern high-
sulfur coal industry. See id. at 27, 31, 37, 126. The failure of the political process, it has been observed,
also led to a failure in substance. Although the basic purpose of the Clean Air Act is (obviously) to
"clean the air," id. at 109, the 1977 amendments may have made the air dirtier by increasing the cost of
new power plants so much that utilities had an incentive to keep their older, dirtier facilities in operation
longer than they might have with a scrubber requirement. See id. at 78.
147 See Pierce, supra note 129, at 404-05. Pierce notes that "large numbers of issues, large num-
bers of participants in as a group decisionmaking process, inadequate information, and inadequate fore-
sight" all impair the ability of the legislative process to aggregate preferences. In addition, relying on
the work of Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen, Pierce suggests that, even if Congress addressed only one
issue each session, there would be analytic problems with majoritarian preference aggregation by Con-
gress. Id.; see also Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53
(1977); KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). But see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REv. 949, 955
(1990) (noting "cardinality and interpersonal comparability of individual welfare functions are all but
inherent in the process of representative decisionmaking").
148 See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. Rnv. 1, 56-
58 (1982).
149 Thomas McGarity critically describes agency rulemaking under the pluralist approach. Solu-
tions to problems, according to McGarity, "depend heavily upon professional judgment." MCGARITY,
supra note 132, at 7. But, in practice, much expertocratic thinking "is really grounded in a kind of in-
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within a system of masked rationality. Decisionmakers are often forced to
"muddle through" complex problems, making the best decisions they can
given political constraints. s15  In addition to their specialized training and
experience, agency decisionmakers regularly use cognitive tools to assist
them in making their decisions. They "satisfice" instead of maximize: in-
stead of trying too hard to maximize some value, such as social utility,
agency decisionmakers instead adopt some acceptable goal short of their
ideal. 5' They act incrementally, which allows for concentration on famil-
iar, better known problems, reduces the number of policy choices to be ex-
plored, and sharply reduces the number and complexity of factors a
decisionmaker has to analyze.1 52 They rely on feedback: by making policy
choices that yield information, this improves the ability of decisionmakers
to make quality choices in the future.1 5  Where they face high levels of un-
certainty,1 4 they are often aided by simplifying devices and heuristic short-
cuts. 155  Because of these shortcuts, often embraced for political reasons,
tuition that is informed by technical training and experience"; that is, decisionmakers "do not analyze
the problem and derive a solution so much as they 'feel' their way through to an answer, accommodat-
ing as many affected interests as possible along the way to reduce the external resistance to their ulti-
mate resolution of the problem." Id.
Under the pluralist approach, the agency's "primary institutional goal is to produce rules that have a
reasonable chance of surviving the inevitable political and legal attacks and that are capable to a toler-
able degree of effective implementation in the real world." Id. As McGarity describes the agency rule-
making process, the program office, housing the experts, typically drafts a "decision memorandum" for
upper-level, politically accountable agency decisionmakers:
The memo lists three options, discusses the first and last options in a cursory fashion, discusses the
second option in great detail, and recommends that the agency adopt number two. Unless the up-
per level decisionmakers are willing to devote substantial time to studying the problem and the
program office's proposed solution, they will usually agree to number two or some minor variation
thereof.
Id. at 8. The agency's proposal is then published in the Federal Register for public comment. In re-
sponse to the public's comments, as with internal suggestions, however, "drastic overhauls, although not
unheard of, are rare." Id.
15o Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
11 Cf Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
152 See DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 114-19 (1963).
IS3 See id. at 120-24.
154 Rational decisionmaking in situations of uncertainty has been discussed extensively in the lit-
erature. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982); Amos Tversy & Daniel Khaneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W.
Reder eds., 1987).
155 A heuristic simplifies a complex network of information into a simple shorthand, analytic
framework. When trying to assess the validity of a position, for example, decisionmakers may compare
the numbers of reasons they can think of that favor the position with the number of reasons against it.
See Eldar Shafir et al., Reason Based Choice, 49 COGNITION, Oct.-Nov. 1993, at 11. Following this
heuristic, decisionmakers will favor an initiative if there are three reasons in favor of it while only one
reason against. This heuristic, however, is hardly precise or accurate. Contrary to the heuristic, precise
92:173 (1997)
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some have suggested that, in practice, expertocratic decisionmaking will
rarely be able to avoid the pressures of pluralism.1 56 However, to the extent
that pluralist decisionmaking operates under the guise of science, it raises
serious problems for democratic legitimacy.
Second, pluralism in administrative decisionmaking runs the risk of
powerful factions securing deals in legislation or regulations at the expense
of smaller, more isolated (and perhaps more vulnerable) groups.15 7 In the
context of air pollution regulation, for example, once legislators delegated
the discretion to make policy regarding technology-based environmental
regulation to the EPA, the ability of special interests to derail the regulatory
objective of clean air increased. The EPA, after much internal rift, con-
cluded that a standard that relied on scrubbers was not worth the cost it
would impose on the industry and might even have adverse environmental
consequences in contrast to its alternative-burning much cleaner, low-
sulfur coal primarily from western states.'58 Yet, despite this conclusion,
the EPA adopted a regulation that mandated the scrubber option,15 9 because
the Administrator believed that it would further one of the purposes of the
1977 amendments-to promote the use of high-sulfur coal produced pri-
marily by eastern and Midwestern states.' 60 Likewise, powerful interest
groups may cause regulators to misperceive risks, allocating scarce regula-
tory resources to activities that do not cause the most environmental
and accurate decisionmaking should lead decisionmakers to oppose a position even if there are three
weak reasons in favor of it while only a single decisive reason for opposing it.
Despite their inaccuracy and imprecision, heuristics have been recognized to serve two important
functions. First, they work to reduce the costs of transmitting information, or the casts of engaging in
dialogue. Second, in order to facilitate analytical examination of the information transmitted, they actu-
ally exclude some information. See Fitts, supra note 122, at 940. Perhaps more importantly, though,
heuristics may make otherwise intractable problems solvable-at least at a non-prohibitive cost.
156 See McGARITY, supra note 132, at 8.
157 Now a classic along this line of critique in constitutional jurisprudence is JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Ely, building on the famous
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., juxtaposes "participation enhancing" theories
of judicial review against "fundamental values" theories. The former, Ely argues, are preferable over
the latter
insofar as political officials had chosen to provide or protect X for some people (generally people
like themselves), they had better make sure that everyone was being similarly accommodated or be
prepared to explain pretty convincingly why not... [It seems to be coming into focus that pur-
suit of these participational goals of broadened access to the processes and bounty of representa-
tive government, as opposed to the more traditional and academically popular insistence upon the
provision of a series of particular substantive goods or values deemed fundamental, was what
marked the work of the Warren Court.
Id. at 74-75.
158 See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean
Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1547-50 (1980).
159 See id. at 1553-55.
16 See id. at 1503.
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harms.16 ' Thus, pluralism-by creating a "faction-ridden maze of frag-
mented and often irresponsible micro-politics within the government' ' 162 -
may be antithetical to democratic conceptions of equality and fairness.
3. Deliberative Democracy.-A fairly recent account of agency deci-
sionmaking, loosely referred to as "deliberative democracy," has attempted
to redefine our understanding of administrative agencies as pockets of de-
mocracy.1 63 It provides an alternative to expertocratic, pluralist, and trans-
mission belt models of agency governance,16 4 and it also provides for an
understanding of progressive regulation.165  Furthermore, deliberative de-
mocracy can justify bureaucracy as an element of "sound governance"'166
and suggests that, in certain contexts, agencies have a comparative advan-
161 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFIIVE RISK
REGULATION 11-21 (1993).
162 Richard B. Stewart, Madison 's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L REV. 335,342 (1990).
163 For a recent description, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE
DONE ABOUT IT (1996) (containing an eloquent discussion of the promises of deliberative democracy).
Of course, deliberative democracy is much broader in its application than administrative law. It is often
associated with civic republicanism, which in recent years has inspired a reassessment of constitutional
law. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); Symposium: The Re-
publican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). In addition to administrative law, the impact of
deliberative democracy has also extended to areas such as civil procedure, family law, corporate law,
and torts. For critical reviews ofdeliberative democracy, see Richard H. Fallon, What is Republicanism,
and is it Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Po-
litical Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
(1988); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral
Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate
Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded
Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463 (1996).
16 See Seidenfeld, supra note 120. The transmission belt model understands delegation to agen-
cies as "necessary to fulfill explicit congressional policy." Expertise models understand delegation to
agencies as facilitating "technical expertise ... outside an environment influenced by interest groups and
the political process," while pluralist democracy likens the political process to markets, understanding
agencies as directly aggregating the preferences of their regulated constituents. Id. at 1513. See also
Stewart, supra note 57, at 1711-12 (discussing transmission belt, expertise, and pluralist models).
165 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 107-10 (1990) [hereinafter RIGHTS
REVOLUTION]; Sunstein, supra note 139, at 59-64.
166 CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990). Although Edley does not expressly label himself a deliberative democrat or
civic republican, Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology,
1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 592, others, including myself, have been more inclined to include him in this
group. See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory
Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763; Note, Civic Republican Ad-
ministrative Theory: Bureaucrats as Deliberative Democrats, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
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tage over Congress and the President in making collective policy deci-
sions.167
Over the past ten years, deliberative democracy has afforded a system-
atic challenge to pluralism as a theory of agency legitimacy.16' Deliberative
democracy in administrative law, as with other areas of the law,169 eludes a
simple definition. However, central to all accounts of deliberative democ-
,,170racy is "civic virtue. While civic virtue may be relevant to some plural-
ist accounts of democracy, for deliberative democrats it is more than the
mere result of a political process: "In the republican vision, a primary
function of government is to order values and define virtue, and thereby
educate its citizenry to be virtuous. 171
Civic virtue is necessary to the deliberative democratic decisionmaking
process, not just a fortunate byproduct of it. 72 Despite the centrality of
civic virtue, deliberative democrats have failed to define it specifically. It is
fair to say, though, that among those who embrace deliberative democracy
167 See Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1515 ("[O]n the whole, civic republicanism is consistent
with broad delegations of political decisionmaking authority to officials with greater expertise and fewer
immediate political pressures than either elected officials or legislators.").
168 Lindblom, noting the shortcomings of the pluralist approach to deliberation, distinguishes
between residual conflict resolution, akin to pluralism, and probing, akin to deliberative democracy, as a
means of solving conflict:
As a method of conflict resolution, the vast scope of probing consequently contrasts with an only
residual (which is not unimportant) process of conflict resolution through power in the hands of
government and other institutions. Inquiry continues without end, always a source of new agree-
ments. The Dutch came to their distinctive social welfare program largely because they probed or
talked their way to agreement, not because the government imposed a program to resolve earlier
discordance. And it may turn out that such deep conflict as separates Protestant from Catholic in
Northern Ireland will be resolved, if ever at all, by discourse, so futile appear the attempts of the
British government to impose or coerce a resolution.
LINDBLOM, supra note 75, at 48.
169 See Gey, supra note 163, at 805 ("[E]ven if consideration of civic republicanism is limited to
the theory's modem variations, it is difficult to define the doctrine. Modem civic republicans disagree
among themselves about basic issues, such as the identity of their historical predecessors, and the rela-
tionship of civic republicanism to traditional liberalism.").
170 Jon Elster views the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" as requiring people to speak in public re-
garding terms, even though they may be self interested. See Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 236 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). Sunstein concurs: "If'hy-
pocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue,' at least we can say that in a system of public deliberation,
everyone must speak as if he were virtuous even though he is not in fact." CASS R. SUNsTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 244 (1993) (quoting LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS
65 (L. Tancock trans., New York 1959)). Although Gutmann and Thompson are skeptical about the
inherent tendency of open debate to "transform self-interested claims into public-spirited ones," for them
publicity, one of their basic principles of deliberation, "helps to rule out arguments that one would not
accept if others made them." GUTMANIN & THOMPSON, supra note 163, at 126.
171 Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 543, 552 (1986).
172 See Gey, supra note 163, at 806 ("The concept of civic virtue is the leitmotif of all civic re-
publican theory."); Sunstein, supra note 139, at 31 (noting "animating principle" of republican concep-
tion of the Constitution was civic virtue).
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as an account of bureaucratic legitimacy there is strong agreement as to at
least two features that civic virtue, also referred to as deliberation, entails.
a. Dialogue based in reason.-To begin with, deliberation must
occur through a process of dialogue,1 73 or discourse, 174 based in communi-
cative reason. 175 The dialogue provided by deliberative democratic deci-
sionmaking processes goes beyond the rationality provided by expertocratic
models to the extent that it relies upon communicative action within the
regulated community. 176 At the same time, participants, whether agency
referees or the public, are not enjoined merely to respect the viewpoints of
others: they are required to engage these viewpoints, to take them as a
starting point in shaping dialogue and moving towards consensus. 1" A de-
liberative democratic process strives to operate in an engaged mode, some-
where between mere respect and confrontation. When the
decisionmaking process deviates from this mode, it becomes disengaged.
Deliberative democratic dialogue generally occurs. at two levels: at the
level of lay (private citizen) participants-often participating through inter-
est groups-and at the level of institutional decisionmakers. The reasoning
process engaged in by both lay and agency decisionmakers is not solely in-
strumental or strategic-that is, offered for purposes of justifying a pre-
rationalized decision. 79 Instead, it is expected to be communicative and
173 See Sunstein, supra note 139, at 31 (noting that "[d]ialogue and discussion among the citi-
zenry" are "critical features" of the republican vision).
174 See Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1529-30 (arguing that before the government acts, "it must
engage in public discourse about whether the action will further the common good" and "explain how its
decisions further the common good").
175 The parallels to JAlrgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, and Bruce Ackerman's
extension to social justice, are obvious. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 353 (1980) (envisioning a discussion about liberal justice in which "the legitimacy of each and
every intuition is vindicated through dialogue"); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 25 (William Rehg trans., 1996)
(1992) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; JORGEN HABERmAs, 1 THE THEORY OF
COMmUNICATIVE ACTION 101 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (describing communicative process by
which political actors attempt to reach an understanding and orient themselves to future common ac-
tions); see also infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (discussing the ideal speech situation).
176 Political philosophers have recognized the distinction between rationality and reasonableness.
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48-54 (1993). For a recent discussion of the distinction in the
context of tort law, see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
177 "A deliberative process will not result in unanimity or even consensus." SUNSTEN, supra
note 170, at 247.
178 Hence, Gutmann and Thompson place reciprocity, their first principle of deliberation, some-
where between impartiality, motivated by disinterested altruism, and prudence, motivated by self-
interest. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 163, at 53.
179 The distinction between communicative and strategic actions is discussed in HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 175, at 25. As Pettit suggests, a key contrast between plural-
ism and deliberative decisionmaking is that while the former backgrounds reason, the latter places rea-
son in the foreground of the decisionmaking process. PETTIT, supra note 28, at 202-05.
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dynamic, and to have a direct effect on the final decision. Communicative
reasoning presupposes the application of dialogic structures, such as scien-
tific or economic models, and semiotic tools, such as heuristics and satis-
ficing, for purposes of furthering dialogue. 8
b. Decisionmakers and citizens do not act solely on preferences ex-
ogenous to the decisionmakingprocess.-Second, unlike pluralist accounts,
deliberative democratic decisionmaking does not take individual prefer-
ences as exogenous to the political process. Rather, private citizens in the
political process must transcend their own conceptions of self interest:
"[I]n their capacity as political actors, citizens and representatives are not
supposed to ask only what is in their private interest, but also what will best
serve the community in general."' 8t Government outcomes are reflective of
"citizens devoted to a public good separate from the struggle of private in-
terests."'8 2 This is not to say that citizens may not express private prefer-
ences in the political process; however, to the extent that they do rely on
their personal experiences and values, rather than the public good, the deci-
sionmaking process ensures that these preferences are reflexive and not
simply accepted as reasons for action without critical examination. 183 "The
republican belief in deliberation counsels political actors to achieve a meas-
ure of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting
these desires and practices to scrutiny and review.' 114  The deliberative
180 On dialogic structures and semiosis within Habermas' theory of communicative action, see
Benjamin Lee, Textuality, Mediation, and Public Discourse, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
402, 409-12 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
181 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1550 (1988) (noting
that political actors should look "to the public good") (citing J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT (1975)); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1537-38.
182 Sunstein, supra note 139, at 36.
183 Hence, Gutmann and Thompson value accountability as their third principle of deliberation.
See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 163, at 128-64. Evidence suggests that the natural inclination
of citizens may tend towards uncritical revelation of preferences. It has been noted that people "tend...
to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing cir-
cumstances, while viewing alternative responses as uncommon." Lee Ross et al., The "False Consen-
sus " Effect: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 279,280(1977). However, there is also evidence that deliberation has a transformative
effect on one's beliefs. See, e.g., NORMAN FROHLICH & JOSEPH OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE
(1992); John Orbell et al., Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 811 (1988). Public dialogue itself may cause public and private preferences to diverge. See
TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION (1995) (exploring the causes and consequences of holding one set of opinions privately
while expressing another in public). This suggests the difficulty of defining a pluralist criterion for pref-
erence aggregation when individual preferences are highly malleable. See Robert H. Frank, The Politi-
cal Economy of Preference Falsification, 2imur Kuran's Private Truths, Public Lies, 34 J. ECON. LIT.
115, 119 (1996) (book review).
184 Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1548-49.
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democratic decisionmaking process is not only reactive to preferences, but
it also seeks affirmatively to mold and shape them
185
B. Participation in the Models ofAgency Decisionmaking
Regardless of the decisionmaking model, 186 participation lends legiti-
macy to agency decisions. The rationales for participation, however, vary
from model to model. The expertocratic model values participation pri-
marily for providing information, although the model recognizes some
other values from participation as well. Pluralist models depend upon par-
ticipation to make the process of preference exchange fairer. Deliberative
democratic models see participation as valuable for these reasons, but also
for purposes of forging greater understanding and consensus about the
common good among participants.
At first blush, the need for participation seems least acute within the
expertocratic model. However, as a justification for collective social action,
the expertocratic model relies upon participation in several respects. First,
even for strident advocates of expertise, participation continues to play an
important role in ensuring oversight and accountability; to the extent the
expertocratic models do not completely eschew oversight and accountabil-
ity, participation will be valued for these purposes. Lay participation be-
hooves agencies to formulate reasons for their decisions in language that is
understandable to the public at large.18 7 Second, participation may be im-
portant to counteract the effects of faction in the expert decisionmaking
process-to preclude the expertocratic model from transforming itself into
strategic-rationalized pluralism. Third, and most important to expertocratic
models, is the information provision function: to the extent that participa-
185 See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 26-42
(1983).
186 While some express a clear preference for one of the models in all agency decisionmaking
contexts, I am less inclined to suggest that one model, invariably, is preferable. The expertocratic model
may become more appropriate with the intellectual difficulty of the task at hand, fitting the regulatory
tasks of, say, the Patent Office or the Internal Revenue Service; the pluralist model may become more
appropriate if the number of people directly affected by the process comprises a significant portion of
the community and is likely to be heard in the process, as with a local zoning board; the deliberative
democratic model may best fit big and highly controversial issues, such as social security or health care
reform at the state or national level.
187 For example, for Justice Stephen Breyer, who envisions a centralized bureaucratic group of
experts, this oversight rationale is paramount:
[Tihe existence of a single, rationalizing group of administrators can ... facilitate democratic con-
trol, for it would reduce a mass of individual decisions to a smaller number of policy choices, pub-
licize the criteria used to make those choices.... and thereby make it easier for Congress, or the
public, to understand what the Executive Branch is doing and why.... mo create clear lines of
authority, to facilitate the assignment ofresponsibility is to empower the public.
BREYER, supra note 161, at 74.
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tion provides agency decisionmakers with information, more participation
can provide better data and ensure more comprehension.
188
Lay participation is also important to pluralist models of decisionmak-
ing, but primarily to encourage the formation of interest groups in order to
make the playing field of exchange politics fairer. Further, pluralism is
compatible with skepticism about the scientific claims of rationality. Plu-
ralists prefer that all preferences, whether scientific or lay, be treated
equally in the political process without evaluating the merit of any individ-
ual preference. Thus, to the extent that pluralism embraces skepticism, it
makes participation the only mechanism that can achieve truly democratic
solutions 9
Although some deliberative democrats have claimed that pluralism
provides for and justifies narrow participation in the political process,190 to-
day most pluralist theories of democracy make broad calls for openness in
government and participatory democracy. 9 For pluralists, a more public
and participatory process greases the wheels of preference exchange. For
example, Robert Dahl, a pluralist, makes "effective participation" one of the
five criteria for any democratic process:
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an
adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their prefer-
ences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportuni-
ties for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for
endorsing one outcome rather than another.
192
Democracy, for modem pluralists, lives hand-in-hand with participatory
democracy.
93
Participation is also viewed as necessary to contemporary deliberative
democratic accounts of agencies, 94 but for a broader range of reasons. 95
1ss See Mary Gisez Kweit & Robert W. Kweit, The Politics of Policy Analysis: The Role of Citi-
zen Participation in Analytic Decisionmaking in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
19,25-30 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987).
189 See BOTWINICK, supra note 143.
190 Sunstein asserts that "[p]luralist approaches place no premium on political participation."
Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1546. For some pluralists, the absence ofparticipation in open government
process is taken to suggest contentment with the status quo. See BERNARD R. BERELSON Er AL.,
VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1954); MILBRATH, Supra
note 30. However, this version of pluralism-one that allows participation to only the most powerful
interest groups-is relatively weak.
191 See Stewart, supra note 57.
192 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 109 (1989).
193 See ELY, supra note 157; Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1972).
194 Pettit argues against the populist tendency of modem civic republican or deliberative demo-
cratic theories. See PETTIT, supra note 28, at 8-9.
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Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that deliberative democracy is based on
several principles, foremost among them deliberation and participation:
196
political actors "generate institutions that will produce deliberation among
those differently situated, not to mimic decisions.., made by the unsitu-
ated.' 197 For Mark Seidenfeld as well, participation is central to delibera-
tive democratic legitimacy: "[Plarticipation by all facets of society,
deliberation prior to agency decisionmaking, and justification of the deci-
sion in terms of the public interest (including explanations of deviations
from past conceptions) encourage regulators to think hard about their own
conceptions of the public interest."1 8 Moreover, James Fishkin specifies
four simple conditions for an ideal democratic process, central among them
deliberation and participation.19
9
For these deliberative democrats, participation-opening up political
processes to interests and providing additional access points-works "to
monitor the behavior of representatives in order to limit the risks of faction-
alism and self-interested representation. ' '200 According to Sunstein:
Impartiality within republican theories... require[s] [a] public regarding
[of] justifications after multiple points of view have been consulted and (to the
extent possible) genuinely understood....
195 Despite its pejorative connotation, elitist deliberation, or deliberation independent of direct
political participation, is not rejected by deliberative democrats. Democratic elitism-the incorporation
of elitist principles within democratic theory-finds support in the writings of Peter Bachrach and Wil-
liam McDougal. See BACHRACH, supra note 85; WILLIAM MCDOUGAL, Is AMERICA SAFE FOR
DEMOCRACY? (1921). On elitist deliberation, see FISHKIN, supra note 88, at 32 ("In spite of two centu-
ries of attempts to defend elite deliberation, it is arguable that the Congress we have finally developed is
close enough to being an instructed body, at least on many issues, that there is no longer any irony in the
choice of terms.").
The issue, however, is not reducible to labels. Rather, it harks back to an old debate often associated
with Edmund Burke's distinction between a congress and a parliament. By a congress, Burke meant a
meeting of ambassadors, as in a treaty negotiation. Ambassadors in such a setting are bound by instruc-
tions from their respective states. A parliament, by contrast, is a more deliberative body, in which repre-
sentatives exercise independent judgment. See Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol on
Being Elected (Nov. 1774), in THE POLTCAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND BURKE 110 (lain Hampsher-
Monk ed., 1987). The contemporary debate raises the question whether decisionmakers, as representa-
tives, "ought to be viewed as autonomous or automatons." See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics,
82 VA. L. REV. 567 (1996) (raising the issue in the context of the "Contract with America").
196 Sunstein's version of civic republicanism is characterized by four distinctive principles: (1)
deliberation in politics, or what he calls "civic virtue," (2) equality of political actors, (3) universalism,
or a common good made possible by "practical reason," and (4) citizenship, "manifesting itself in
broadly guaranteed rights of participation." Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1541.
197 Id. at 1571.
191 Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1571.
199 FISHKIN, supra note 88, at 34. Fishkin's conditions include: (1) political equality, (2) delib-
eration, (3) participation, and (4) nontyranny. Id.
200 Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1556.
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M.. [Tihe basic constitutional institutions of federalism, bicameralism,
and checks and balances share some of the appeal of proportional representa-
tion,... proliferat[ing] the points of access to government, increasing the abil-
ity of diverse groups to influence policy, multiplying perspectives in
government, and improving deliberative capacities.
201
Civic republican decisionmaking, writes Sunstein, "produce[s] high
levels of participation and genuine deliberation." 2°2  Thus, deliberative
democrats, like pluralists, view participation as important because it dif-
fuses the influence of the most powerful special interests by ensuring that
everyone else has access to the political process as well, exposing partici-
pants and agency decisionmakers to a broad and diverse range of perspec-
tives.
For most deliberative democrats, though, participation is of much
broader significance than it is for pluralists. Participation is not only in-
strumental, but it is also celebrated as a way of inculcating characteristics
such as empathy, virtue, and feelings of community:20 3 "Once the partici-
patory system is established... it becomes self-sustaining because the very
qualities that are required by individual citizens if the system is to work
successfully are those that the process of participation itself develops and
fosters."20 These characteristics, of course, feed back into the deliberative
process.20 5 Moreover, large scale participation may help to make citizens
aware of new proposals and alternatives to their existing preferences, and
give them access to otherwise unavailable information. This increases the
propensity of regulators to shape and mold not only civic virtue itself, but
also individuals' preferences on substantive policy and political issues.z 6
Whether, and when, deliberation and participation converge in the de-
liberative democratic model depends upon our conception of the common
good, toward which a deliberative democratic decisionmaking process as-
pires. Procedural and substantive definitions of the common good yield
21 Id. at 1575, 1586 (footnotes omitted). Seidenfeld concurs:
The civic republican goal that government policy reflect political consensus requires open access
to the policymaking process. Representatives of all interests potentially affected by a government
action must have meaningful opportunities to engage in discussion about the action.... Broad
rights of access... allow champions of particular values to communicate their perspectives to
government decisionmakers, and they facilitate the decisionmakers' communication of the reasons
for their decision-how their decision takes account of various perspectives-to the citizenry.
Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1530 (footnotes omitted).
202 SUNSTEIN, supra note 170, at 244.
203 See Brest, supra note 84, at 1624; Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1536; Sunstein, supra note
181, at 1556.
204 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 25 (1970).
205 For Ely, too, participation is not only instrumental. See ELY, supra note 157, at 75 n. *
206 See Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1537 (By informing citizens about others' conceptions of
the public interest and by revealing to them how their own conceptions might harm others, the delibera-
tive process can help educate citizens and unmask self-delusions."). See also ELSTER, supra note 185, at
36-37; LINDBLOM, supra note 75.
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slightly different relationships, and hence balances, between participation
and deliberation.
20 7
If the common good is entirely a matter of an agency's decisionmaking
procedure, participation and deliberation will often, but not always, be
complementary, and citizens who participate in agency decisions will be af-
forded all of the advantages of a deliberative process. 208 Likewise, delib-
eration depends upon participation because for the common good to prevail
throughout the process, members of the affected community must be al-
lowed to participate directly in its deliberations. As I discuss in Part IV,
however, too much participation may impair the deliberative quality of this
process. Encouraging deliberation, then, becomes a matter of managing
participation to ensure that the process remains sufficiently deliberative.
To the extent, the common good has a significant substantive compo-
nent, deliberative democracy need only allow a minimal level of participa-
tion. Although deliberative democratic decisionmakers do not make claims
to discovery of a single right answer, they do engage in a scientific and ra-
tionalist dialogue that demands some critical distance from the immediate
political process. To the extent that this model prevails, less broadly based
participation will be acceptable to deliberative democrats, although even
here participation may still be valued to the extent this type of exercise of
positive liberty works to protect negative liberties.
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATION
Unlike expertocratic and pluralist decisionmaking models, deliberative
democracy, as it has found expression in the administrative law literature,
challenges its supporters to examine the relationship between two demo-
cratic ideals, namely participation and deliberation. On their face, the ideals
seem to be complements-perhaps even inextricably so. Participation
complements deliberation by helping to limit monopoly rents from interest
group politics, by providing better information, and by fostering democratic
process and citizenship. Deliberation ensures that participation in agency
decisions will be meaningful and not perfunctory.
However, deliberative democracy harbors a tension that demands fur-
ther analytical exploration. In order to be deliberative and democratic, in-
stitutions must provide for meaningful participation by individuals and
groups from a broad and diverse range of perspectives. Yet, as I will argue
in this Part, if institutions allow too much of certain types of participation
they are no longer deliberative. Participation, while necessary to the delib-
erative democratic conceptions of legitimacy, also threatens the ability of
deliberative democracy alone to provide an account of political legitimacy.
207 On the tension between substantive and procedural conceptions of the con-anon good in civic
republicanism, see Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CM.
L. REV. 131,138-42 (1995); see also Gey, supra note 163, at 854-94.
208 See Note, supra note 166.
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The tension between participation and deliberation, this Part suggests, casts
doubt upon the claims of deliberative democracy to realize its ideals
through the American administrative process.
A. Exploring the Relationship Between Participation and Deliberation
As a conceptual matter, deliberation is quite separable from participa-
tion.209 Participation helps to ensure that agency decisions are responsive to
the will of the public, transparent, and open. Deliberation, by contrast, re-
moves decision events from the immediate influence of the public, slowing
down the political process and giving it a deeper legitimacy; it ensures that
collective decisions are something more than the consensus of "mere ma-
jorities." While participation encourages breadth in the agency decision-
making process, deliberation is more concerned with depth.
It is theoretically possible for political institutions to allow for mass
participation without much deliberation. In ancient Sparta, for example,
representatives were elected by a method called "the Shout": impartial ob-
servers simply assessed the volume of the cheering each candidate received
when he walked in front of the mass assembly throng, and the candidate
with the loudest vocal endorsement was deemed the winner.210 Likewise, it
is theoretically possible for political institutions to provide deliberation
without participation. One can imagine, for instance, a set of politically in-
sulated experts appointed to assess health and environmental risks.2' In
practice, however, political institutions, including administrative agencies,
attempt to provide for both.
As a point of departure, it is useful to consider what J-irgen Habermas
posits as the ultimate deliberative state-the ideal speech situation.212 In
such a conversation, all arguments posed by participants are answered in a
context of free and equal discussion.2 3 If such a conversation continues for
209 My analysis in this section is intended to make some general claims about the relationship
between participation and deliberation, and explore their implications for a well-functioning system of
agency governance. I do not intend to make predictive claims about what happens invariably in the
agency decisionmaking context.
210 The term "the Shout" has been used by modem scholars. See JON ELsTER, SOLOMONIC
JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 85-86 (1989). The Spartan system is described in
Plutarch's Lycurgus. See PLUTARCH ON SPARTA 38-39 (Richard J.A. Talbert trans., Penguin Books
1988).
211 Justice Stephen Breyer, before his appointment to the Supreme Court, proposed the estab-
lishment of a small, centralized administrative group of career civil servants to rationalize health and
environmental risk assessment. BREYER, supra note 161, at 59-61.
212 See JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1975).
213 The ideal speech situation, according to Habermas, assumes a background consensus emerg-
ing from mutual recognition of four different validity claims (so-called Geltungsacsprache) involved in
the exchange of speech acts (1) claims that each individual's utterances are understandable, (2) claims
that their propositional content is true, (3) claims that each speaker is sincere in uttering them, and (4)
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a sufficient length of time, it is quite possible that, ultimately, the only rea-
son a question might be resolved is because the force of the better argument
is able to persuade those who hold differing perspectives. 214 Such is the
ideal deliberative state in any communicative political process. In practice,
however, the ability of institutions to provide for this ideal state is seriously
constrained. Institutions must make due with scarce resources. Agencies,
for example, work with limited staff. In addition, agencies inay not always
have the time to wait for the force of the better argument to prevail. Con-
versations must come to an end in order to solve practical problems and
avoid their exacerbation.
2 15
Participation and deliberation in the administrative process often com-
plement each other. As a general matter, as the number of participants (ac-
cess points) in an administrative process is expanded at the various levels of
decisionmaking, the amount of monopoly rents powerful interest groups
may be able to extract will decrease. This works to reinforce the norms of
political equality that are central to democratic deliberation. The amount of
information before decisionmakers will also increase: a greater number of
issues will be raised, the proposed set of solutions for decisionmaking will
increase, and the amount of data with respect to issues and solutions will
increase. "Public deliberation may reveal the truth or falsity of factual
claims about the state of the world or about the likely effects of policy pro-
posals. 216 Participants and decisionmakers will have more information to
analyze, evaluate, and act upon. Increased participation enhances delibera-
tion by broadening the number of proposed solutions for each agenda item
and giving agencies more information on which they can base their final
decisions. Thus, initially an increase in access points will work to create
positive information effects by facilitating greater participation while also
minimizing the monopoly rents that powerful interest groups may seek to
gain from the regulatory process. Threshold levels of participation will not
impair but enhance deliberative agency decisions.
At some point, however, the benefits of information provided by in-
creased participation will begin to diminish at the margin and, eventually,
will level off. Eventually, as participation expands, deliberation will peak
and will reach its maximum level. At some point, the proliferation of ac-
cess points will begin to create adverse effects for agency decisionmakers
and for participants: deliberation will begin to decrease as participation ex-
claims that it is right or appropriate for the speaker to be performing the speech act. See id. at xiii-iv
(translator's introduction).
214 See Jargen Habermas, A Reply to my Critics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 219, 269
(John B. Thompson & David Held eds., 1982).
215 "One can discuss for only so long, and then one has to make a decision, even if strong differ-
ences of opinion should remain." ELSTER, supra note 185, at 38.
216 SUNsTmIN, supra note 170, at 243.
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pands, leading to sub-optimal deliberation.217 Fishldn recognizes this phe-
nomenon to the extent that he concedes "[a]s we open up opportunities for
participation and political equality for the entire citizenry... we create in-
centives for rational ignorance that destroy deliberation."2 8 A goal of ad-
ministrative law should be to encourage decisionmakers to monitor their
levels and degrees of participation and balance these against the depth of
deliberation.
21
However, participation's adverse effects for deliberation are broader
than the rational ignorance of the participants that Fishldn suggests. Par-
ticipation also has costs for the decisionmaking process. For example, large
numbers of participants may present too much information to decisionmak-
ers, overwhelming the ability of decisionmakers to focus in depth on spe-
cific problems. This, in turn, may create opportunities for strategic uses of
information by participants. While strategic behavior alone is not suspect,
it raises problems for deliberative decisions to the extent that it encourages
the obfuscation of issues or delay with little or no countervailing benefits.
To understand the effects of increases in participation on agency deci-
sions, it is helpful to recognize the dualist nature of agency decisionmaling.
Bureaucratic decisionmaldng dualism employs a distinction between "ordi-
nary" and "constitutive" decisions.220 Ordinary decisions take place within
the structure or context of a specific political-theoretic decisionmaking
model, which describes the day-to-day operation of a decisionmaldng cul-
ture given the goals of a pre-selected decisionmaking model. 22 By con-
trast, constitutive decisions refer to an agency's selection of a political-
217 Cf David W. Orr, US. Energy Policy and the Political Economy of Participation, 41 J.
POLITICS 1027, 1040-44 (1979) (explaining effects of large-scale participation on focus, deliberation,
and efficiency in policy formation).
218 FISHIUN, supra note 88, at 54; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing
Downs' voting paradox).
219 As the D.C. Circuit has noted:
Mhe [Federal Communications] Commission need [not] allow the administrative processes to be
obstructed or overwhelmed by captious or purely obstructive protests. The Commission can avoid
such results by developing appropriate [intervention] regulations by statutory rulemaking.... Ap-
pellants were responsible spokesmen for representative groups having significant roots in the lis-
tening community. These criteria can afford as a basis for developing formalized standards to
regulate and limit public participation to spokesmen who can be helpful.
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(emphasis added).
220 Harold Lasswell, one of the founders of modem policy science, makes this distinction in
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 77 (1971). A similar distinction is made in
BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 4-7 (1996) (distinguishing between instrumental and constitutive
views of administration for purposes of evaluating decisionmaker and public conceptions of bureauc-
racy).
221 "Ordinary policy planning adapts structures and functions to the modest changes compatible
with established doctrines, formulas, and miranda." LASSWELL, supra note 220, at 77. Cook's analogue
to ordinary decisionmaking, "instrumental" administration, is defined by him in an epistemic manner, as
a means-ends rationality, COOK, supra note 220, at 4.
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theoretic model--expertocratic, pluralist, or deliberative democratic-
which, in turn, influences an agency's decisionmaking culture.m Selection
of such a model is important because it will affect an agency's mind set, its
allocation of staff resources and expertise, and its institutional relationship
with and reaction to participation by the public.223 Expertocratic decision-
making cultures, for example, are likely to allocate their staff resources in a
manner very different from pluralist cultures, and this allocation of re-
sources will affect how expertocratic cultures respond to lay participants.
Regardless of the decisionmaking culture, increased participation may
affect ordinary agency decisions in several ways. First, participation of a
broad range of interests before an agency may affect the ability of agency
decisionmakers to control their own agendas and set priorities. As agency
supervision over regulatory agendas diminishes, agency decisionmaking
processes lose their potential for neutral analysis. Moreover, agency ac-
countability to politically responsive oversight institutions, such as the
President and Congress, is reduced; direct participation before any agency
may crowd out participation through formal political institutions. '4 These
adverse effects on neutral analysis and accountability are problematic for
expertocratic decisionmaking. Moreover, as the ability to supervise agen-
das and set priorities decreases, so will the deliberative quality of the proc-
ess, raising problems for deliberative democratic decisionmaking
processes.
222 See LASSWELL, supra note 220, at 77, 98-111. A dualist distinction similar to Lasswell's and
Cook's is employed by Bruce Ackerman, in a different context, in his discussion of American constitu-
tional governance. See ACKERMAN, supra note 112 (distinguishing between ordinary and constitutional
modes of decisionmaking). Constitutional dualism is now widely discussed, ifnot well-accepted, in the
constitutional law and legal theory literature. See RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Symposium on Bruce Ack-
erman's "We the People," 104 ETHICS 446 (1994). However, my analysis, unlike Ackerman's, views
the distinction as one initially made by institutions, including administrative agencies, not by individual
citizens (although individuals citizens, eventually, may perceive and react to the distinction). Further,
the distinction as I employ it, does not depend upon citizens' motivations in the decisionmaking process
(although their motivations may be influenced by the mode of decisionmaking).
2M Rousseau's discussion of the Lawgiver in The Social Contract relies on the work of the
eighteenth-century French philosopher and jurist Montesquieu: "[A]t the birth of political societies, it is
the leaders of the republic who shape the institutions but afterwards it is the institutions which shape the
leaders of the republic." JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 84 (M. Cranston trans.,
1968) (1762).
224 As Mashaw has recognized, "the ricropolitics of a participatory administrative structure may
undermine rather than support what remains of the attachment to legislative control or to rational deci-
sionmaking." MASHAW, supra note 1, at 23. As David Cohen and Peter Strauss have suggested, en-
hanced legislative participation may also crowd out participation in rulemaking by leading agencies to
shift decisionmaking resources to adjudication. Cohen & Strauss, supra note 46, at 109-10.
Even advocates of broadened participation in agency decisionmaking acknowledge the im-
portance of agencies retaining control over their agendas. See Cramton, supra note 8, at 536 ("an
agency and its presiding officer must be able to maintain control of each proceeding in order to bring it
to an expeditious conclusion").
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Second, increases in information facilitated by more participation may
lead to information overload, encouraging poor analysis, superficial exami-
nation of alternatives, and a widening of the gap between complete, precise,
and accurate, as opposed to vague and sloppy, heuristic analysis. Expan-
sion of the interests before decisionmakers will eventually have the effect of
duplicating preexisting agenda items or, perhaps, the number of choices be-
fore an agency for any single agenda item. Some information may be ig-
nored, the task of sifting bad from good information may be burdensome,
or, far worse, bad information may drive out the good. Moreover, the
availability of additional information may affect participants by enticing
them to act strategically. This behavior has the unwelcome effect of polar-
izing existing participants' preferences. Information overload and increased
incentives for strategic action can have adverse effects for both experto-
cratic and deliberative democratic decisionmaking models. To a lesser ex-
tent, overload may also impair the achievement of pluralist goals.
Third, as more lay participants learn about the agency decisionmaking
process, the ability of agency decisionmakers to deliberate collegially may
be impaired. Decisionmakers may lose the ability to meet and discuss items
critically without backlash from the public, forcing superficial, cooled, or
disingenuous discussion. While closing agency discussion altogether from
public participation is not desirable, open meeting laws may have gone too
far towards debilitating the democratic decisionmaking process within ad-
ministrative agencies, thus thwarting the attainment of deliberative demo-
cratic goals.
At the constitutive level, increased participation may also create incen-
tives for decisionmakers to shift agency resources away from efforts at de-
liberative decisionmaking, required by the deliberative democratic model,
and towards expertocratic or pluralist decisionmaking. For example,
agency decisionmakers, frustrated by their inability to satisfy all partici-
pants in the process, may choose to delegate tough political choices to ex-
perts, who can attempt to legitimate their choices by appealing to rational,
scientific jargon. In this way, increases in participation may lead agency
decisionmakers to perceive the expertocratic model as more attractive than
its alternatives. Alternatively, as degrees of participation increase, deci-
sionmakers risk even greater interference of pluralist politics with an
agency's task of devoting depth and focus to its decisions. For example, it
has been observed that much interest group activity in the agenda-setting
context consists not of proposing new agenda items or advocating certain
proposals, but of blocking them. Less seldom, interest groups that press
226 As John Kingdon notes:
[interest groups often seek to preserve prerogatives and benefits they are currently enjoying,
blocking initiatives that they believe would reduce those benefits. Thus regulated truckers in com-
bination with the Teamsters put up a strong fight against trucking deregulation. Hints of increased
landing fees for general aviation (not-for-hire aircraft) and of imposing landing restrictions or re-
quiring new equipment for them brought floods of outcry from pilots all over the country. The op-
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issues persistently and squawk loudly may be able to influence the content
of an agency's agenda. 2 While the increase in information that is brought
on by more participants may make expertise decisionmaking a preferred
format, it also provides greater opportunities for strategic behavior on be-
half of participants-facilitating a shift away from communicative and to-
wards instrumental speech acts. To the extent that decisionmakers perceive
participants as acting strategically based on their pre-existing preferences,
they are likely to find the pluralist model of decisionmaking-as-conflict-
resolution more attractive than the deliberative democratic model.
Participation's effects on ordinary and constitutive decisions can be
understood in the context of several well-accepted mechanisms designed to
enhance participation in administrative governance which have already
been introduced: citizen suits to enforce environmental laws, the NEPA's
EIS process, and sunshine laws. My purpose in exploring these mecha-
nisms is not to suggest that one or more of these are inherently flawed, but
to examine how, if not appropriately structured, the type of participation
provided by each may have deleterious effects on agency governance.
B. Participation s Effects for Ordinary Agency Decisions
Excessive participation interferes with ordinary decisions in at least
three respects: by interfering with agenda setting by politically accountable
agency decisionmakers, by causing information problems for decisionmak-
ers and participants, and by impairing collegiality among decisionmakers.
In this section, I provide examples of how the proliferation of access points,
facilitating increased participation, can create each of these adverse effects,
assuming for the present that the degree and level of participation has not
affected the agency's constitutive decision about which model it wishes to
employ.
1. Interference with Agency Agenda Setting.-One of the more signifi-
cant costs of mass participation for agency decisionmaking is its potential
interference with agency-supervised agenda setting. In practice, this is a
particular problem for broad-based participation in expertocratic and delib-
erative democratic decisionmaking cultures. If agency decisionmakers are
to maintain neutrality in public dialogue over issues, politically accountable
decisionmakers must maintain some degree of supervision over their agen-
das. Moreover, participation before agency decisionmakers may work to
crowd out accountability by virtue of oversight by nonagency political in-
position of medical care providers to health insurance and other new health programs that they be-
lieve run counter to their interests is by now legendary.
KINGDON, supra note 90, at 52.
227 One government official described how an issue rises through his department due to interest
group pressure: "Generally speaking, the louder they squawk, the higher it gets." Id. at 52.
92:173 (1997)
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stitutions, such as Congress or the executive branch. Citizen suits under
federal environmental laws are illustrative of this problem.
228
Citizen suits were designed with the laudable intention of discouraging
unaccountable or irrational decisionmaking by agency experts alone, in-
stead empowering private interests to seek enforcement of environmental
laws.2 9 Some deliberative democrats, such as Sunstein, have embraced
citizen suits and urged Congress to find ways to grant citizen standing
°
that comport with the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,"' in which the Court invalidated a congressional grant of universal
standing to citizens under the Endangered Species Act. Although the num-
ber of citizen suits may comprise a very small portion of participation in
agency decisions, citizen suit provisions under federal environmental stat-
utes provide a clear example of how indiscriminate participation in the
agency decisionmaking process potentially interferes with agency agenda
setting and threatens the deliberative propensity of the process. Consider
citizen suits under the Clean Water Act, n which constitute a disproportion-
ately large percentage of citizen enforcement actions against private pollut-
ers in that context. The Clean Water Act establishes an ideal of zero
discharge to eliminate all pollution, not just harmful pollution.234 Despite
this absolutist goal, the water pollution regulatory system, which operates
under limited resources, has had to make hard choices: the EPA has ex-
hausted most of its resources in regulation of and enforcement against point
228 Citizen suits are described in the text accompanying supra notes 125-28.
229 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Citizen suits were also meant to prevent the ex-
ecutive from undermining Congress's programs by selective enforcement or by its complete failure to
enforce programs due to direct political pressure by polluters. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of
Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991)
(observing that Congress established citizen suit provisions in each of the environmental statutes to pre-
vent agency capture).
23 0 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries" and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 168 (1992) (suggesting that Lujan provides Congress with the flexibility to,
properly understood, create a system of bounties for citizen enforcement or to create property rights in
the benefits provided by regulatory statute).
2" 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
232 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
233 See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE
CORPORATION 10-11 (1988) (describing citizen enforcement actions); Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits
Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 35-53 (1985).
234 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994) ("it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters be eliminated" ); see also Greve, supra note 126, at 115. Measured by this goal, un-
der-enforcement is not difficult to show: any increase in enforcement is better enforcement. Congress's
absolutist standard, perhaps designed to make regulatory choices easier, makes the issues the EPA must
address more difficult by ignoring the issue of the relationship between discharges and water quality.
Under the Clean Water Act, it is quite easy for anyone with minimum training, whether a private citizen
or EPA staff, to discover discharge permit violations and establish liability. Eileen Gauna, Federal En-
vironmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,46-47 (1995).
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sources, such as municipal sewage plants and private industrial facilities.235
While relatively easy to regulate, however, point sources account for a far
smaller portion of water pollution than non-point sources, such as runoff
from construction sites, roads, and agricultural fields.
236
Michael Greve has criticized citizen suits under the Clean Water Act as
"an off-budget entitlement program for the environmental movement.''237
Interest groups participating in decisions under citizen suits are often
guided by the immediate costs and benefits of litigation to themselves, not
by the public benefit of their action.238 Environmental groups tend to target
firms whose discharge records show recent multiple violations, because
such cases are of low cost to such groups and are the easiest to plead in a
complaint.239 This may appear rational, from a public benefit perspective,
to the extent that frequent recent violations may be grounds for suspecting
more substantial, prolonged violations and significant damages. But, as
Greve observes, such suspicions are not based on scientific cost-benefit
analysis, but often on the strategic assessments of privately motivated
groups.2' A group called the Atlantic States Legal Foundation, for exam-
ple, brought multiple actions against private parties over violations of the
voluminous paperwork requirements of the Clean Water Act, not over any
violations of substantive environmental standards.241 The actions generated
tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees, but produced no discernible
environmental benefits.242
23s See Greve, supra note 126, at 115.
236 As of 1986, industrial point sources accounted for 9% of stream pollution and municipal
sources for another 17%. See EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES: EPA'S UPDATE 46
(1988).
237 Greve, supra note 126, at 107.
238 Greve notes:
An analysis of 29 cases between 1983 and 1985 showed that more than 65 percent of the settle-
ments [under Clean Water Act citizen suits], totaling slightly under $1,000,000, went to environ-
mental groups. Another analysis of 30 Clean Water Act citizen suits against alleged polluters in
Connecticut between 1983 and 1986 showed that the total settlement of more than $1.5 million in-
cluded $492,036 in attorney's fees to the NRDC and the Connecticut Fund for the Environment
(who had brought the vast majority of these cases) and $869,500 to the Open Space Institute, an
organization established by and affiliated with the NRDC. No fines were paid to the Treasury in
these cases.
Id. at I 10 (footnotes omitted).
239 See id at 112-13; see also Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model
of Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Dependent Values,
22 GA. L. REV. 337, 402 (1988) (observing that because the Clean Water Act holds violators strictly li-
able and accrues penalties based on the number of perniit violations per day, environmental groups have
an incentive to sue defendants with the highest number of violations, regardless of the seriousness of the
violation).
240 See Greve, supra note 126, at 110.
24, Seeid. at 111.
242 See id. at 111-12. Greve notes that it is a peculiarity of the Clean Water Act citizen suit pro-
vision that it allows citizens to sue not only for an injunction but also for civil penalties up to $25,000,
creating strong incentives for alleged violators to settle. Id. at 109.
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Greve decries citizen suits as a subsidy to private interest groups. In-
deed, for pluralist models, which view the primary role of agency deci-
sionmakers as facilitating deals between private interest groups, the broad
right to bring citizen suits is desirable. Citizen suits make regulation more
responsive by requiring agencies to respond to interest groups' preferences.
Although agencies have limited resources and may not be able to respond
fully to all interest group requests, citizen suits facilitate broader access to
agency enforcement agendas. If such suits were subsidized through attor-
ney's fees when effective-in order to overcome the problem of less
wealthy interest groups or groups that cannot overcome collective action
and coordination problems-they might work to facilitate the pluralist pro-
cess of preference exchange.
Although the types of participation facilitated by citizen suits may be
desirable within the framework of a pluralist model, citizen suits raise some
particular operational problems for expertocratic and deliberative demo-
cratic decisionmaking models. The fact that some interest groups may bene-
fit from citizen suits does not preclude their ability to achieve deliberative
democratic or expertocratic goals.243 Interest groups may present alterna-
tive perspectives regarding the scientific evidence agency experts rely on.
In addition, while interest groups may not always facilitate face-to-face dis-
cussions by individual citizens, they often have a positive impact on the de-
cisionmaking process by allowing those who may be excluded from direct
participation an opportunity for representation.244
However, citizen suits may work to undermine accountability and to
impair neutrality-important goals of the expertocratic and deliberative
democracy models. In contrast to the pluralist understanding of agencies,
which "threatens to... reflect-] private whim,"2 45 expertocratic and delib-
erative democracy decisionmaking models foresee a more independent role
for agency administrators and staff.2 46 For deliberative democrats, for ex-
ample, although the requirement of deliberation "does not exclude com-
promises among those with different conceptions of appropriate
government ends," it does "demand that representatives engage in some
form of discussion about those ends.2 47 In order to do so, politically ac-
243 However, the risk of self-interested strategic behavior by private parties in bringing suit may
raise problems for deliberative democracy. See infra notes 344-49 and accompanying text.
244 Even strong advocates of face-to-face deliberation, such as J. Jane Mansbridge, observe that
some distance is appropriate in situations of high conflict. J. JANE MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND
ADVERSARIAL DEMOCRACY 272-77 (1980); see also JOHN GASTIL, DEMOCRACY IN SMALL GROUPS:
PARTICIPATION, DECISION MAKING & COMMUNICATiON 131-33 (1993) (discussing deliberation in geo-
graphically dispersed groups).
245 Sunstein, supra note 139, at 63.
246 See id.
247 Id. at 84 (footnote omitted).
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countable decisionmakers must retain supervision over agency agendas.248
Agency-supervised agenda setting is important for two reasons: first, it pro-
vides accountability; second, it ensures a decisionmaking setting that is
conducive to neutral analysis.
To begin with, citizen suits dilute the direct accountability of agencies
to formal political institutions. Unlike Congress and the executive branch,
agencies are not directly accountable to the political process. The supervi-
sion of agenda setting by politically accountable agency decisionmakers
provides a linkage between agency policy choices and the political process.
As nonaccountable private enforcers sue under citizen suits, the President
and Congress lose some of their ability to control agency decisions through
their oversight functions, which are integral to the deliberative decision-
making process.2 49 Thus, by encouraging immediate participation in courts
by affected individuals and entities, such mechanisms may have the effect
of crowding out participation through other institutional channels. 2 °0
For example, one of the President's most important constitutional du-
ties is the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."251 A unitary executive is important in the policymaking context for
several reasons.252 First, access to the President as a mechanism for influ-
encing policy ensures that the political process is open to any concerned
248 Agenda setting refers to the ability of politically accountable agency decisionmakers to define
the range of policy choices, set priorities, and reach internal consensus as to a course of action. Espe-
cially when agencies deal with problems of high significance, they must "attend to these problems in a
serial, one-at-a-time (or best a-few-at-a-time) fashion." SIMON,, supra note 123, at 79.
249 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 163, at 138-39 ("deliberative accountability re-
quires representatives to give reasons to citizens and to respond to the reasons citizens give").
250 For a discussion of how citizen suits may violate Article II's establishment of a unitary ex-
ecutive, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3 (President's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted"), see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Charles S. Abell,
Ignoring the Trees for the Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the
Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1995); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G.
Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793 (1993). Several defendants
have challenged the constitutionality of citizen suits on the ground that they violate separation of powers
principles, but lower courts have uniformly rejected such arguments. See generally Delaware Valley
Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132, 1137-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993); National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 815-17 (N.D. 111. 1988);
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 623-26 (D. Md. 1987); Stu-
dent Public Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1478-79 (D.N.J.
1985).
251 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. For a tempered discussion of the importance of presidential control
to deliberative democratic decisionmaking models, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to
Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1994).
252 On the significance of the unitary executive, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna
B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YA E L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing that origi-
nalist interpretation confirms exclusive presidential authority over the execution of federal law); Law-
rence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(arguing that literal analysis of framer's intent does not justify a strong unitary executive, but "nonhis-
torical" concerns do).
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citizen who disagrees with the steps an agency has taken to address public
problems.253 Second, if agency decisionmakers are accountable both to
Congress and the executive branch, the opportunities for participants to
avail themselves of strategic behavior, causing delay and, potentially, cap-
turing the agency decisionmaking process, are minimized.25 4 Third, and
most important to policymaking, giving control over policy decisions to the
President brings significant control and coordination advantages2 5
Further, while agency-supervised agenda setting provides for a certain
degree of accountability, or responsiveness, to the political process, it also
helps to ensure that the decisionmaking process is not entirely political.
This is important for the operation of the expertocratic model, to the extent
it reinforces rationality in the decisionmaking process, and the deliberative
democracy model, to the extent it facilitates consideration of scientifically
informed alternatives in the deliberative process. As described by Thomas
McGarity, agency experts are often required to assume the role of policy
advocates in order to minimize political backlash against an agency's deci-
sion. However, this does not necessarily create a sufficient layer of insula-
tion to allow rational or scientific dialogue to flourish. Expert
decisionmaking is grounded in facts and analysis, and must maintain some
degree of neutrality if it is to take scientific and professional norms seri-
ously. To maintain neutrality, agency experts should limit their role to in-
forming politically accountable decisionmakers about how various options
work toward achieving the goals politically accountable decisionmakers
have selected and prioritized6 Neutrality depends, in this account, upon
effective agenda setting norms within an agency that encourage politically
accountable decisionmakers, not policy analysts, to select and rank goals.
With respect to the selection of broad subjects for agency discussion,
often referred to as agenda items, John Kingdon-in contrast to
McGarity-suggests that the top-down model of the executive branch is a
more accurate description of actual agency decisions. By and large, politi-
cal appointees-not politically insulated experts on an agency's staff-are
responsible for setting agendas or determining the subjects to which subor-
dinates will be paying attention.2 57 Once policy or enforcement agendas are
253 See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 250, at 1801.
254 See id. But, it has been observed, dual accountability may lead to a disavowal ofresponsibil-
ity. See Shapiro, supra note 48.
255 See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 250, at 1801. See also Seidenfeld, supra note 251 (noting
the importance of strong presidential guidance at the general level, but also warning of problems with
presidential micromanagement of issues).
256 MCGARITY, supra note 132, at 11-12. McGarity thus suggests "techno-bureaucratic" ration-
ality as an alternative to comprehensive rationality. Id. at 5-16.
2 KINGDON, supra note 90, at 33. According to Kingdon's research, non-political appointees,
such as career agency staff, are less likely to choose the issues under consideration in an agency. How-
ever, this "hidden cluster" of decisionmakers does have a high impact on supplying the inputs to these
broad subjects, such as the range of alternatives and implementation of the agenda topics. Id. at 34. "It
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set, career bureaucrats are better-positioned than political appointees to deal
on a day-to-day basis with such issues because they have more longevity,
better expertise, and the relationships with interest groups, committees, and
other agencies to forge sound and accountable decisions.
258
Citizen suits have an adverse effect on ordinary expertocratic and de-
liberative democracy decisionmaking cultures to the extent that they inter-
fere with agency-supervised agenda setting. For example, it has been
observed that private enforcement of water pollution laws through citizen
suits has not been directed, as intended, against local violations that tend to
escape EPA enforcement.2 59 By duplicating the EPA's already effective
regulation of point source pollution, citizen suit provisions may have led to
over-enforcement.
While it seems counterintuitive to suggest that water can be too clean,
over-enforcement of point source water pollution has adverse repercussions
for other EPA enforcement priorities and policy decisions, given EPA's
limited enforcement resources. Private enforcers under Clean Water Act
citizen suits must give notice to the government of their intent to sue, and
citizen suits are preempted by governmental enforcement measures.26
Only by initiating its own "diligent enforcement" action can the govern-
ment stop private enforcers. 261 As Greve observes, "[s]ince the government
cannot stop citizen suits by any means short of instituting its own proceed-
ings, private parties can force the government into enforcement actions, in-
cluding pointless and counterproductive ones. 2 62 The Justice Department
has insisted that the EPA bring its own suits concurrent with private citizen
suits, so that it can remedy inadequate private settlements or ensure that a
portion of the settlement goes to the Treasury.263 Moreover, private interest
is quite common for the higher-level appointees to define an agenda item and then to solicit the advice
of careerists in drafting the proposals." Id.; see also id. at 72 (distinguishing a "visible cluster" of press
and high level appointees from a "hidden cluster" of career bureaucrats and staff).
258 Id. at 35-37.
259 See Greve, supra note 126, at 113.
2W 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1994).
261 Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA citizen enforcement suits are precluded if the
Administrator or state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a federal or state
court. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(3) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B)
(1994). Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 to provide that certain types of administrative
proceedings may also bar citizen suits. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1994).
262 Greve, supra note 126, at 117; Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Controlg Laws Part I, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,407, 10,428 (1984) (arguing that the existing scheme of
coordinating private and public enforcement poses awkward problems); see also Boyer & Meidinger,
supra note 128, at 838-39 (noting that the coordination of private and public enforcers is one of the key
problems with private enforcement).
263 See Greve, supra note 126, at 117. Citizen suits could have a res judicata effect on the theory
that plaintiffs, acting in the capacity of public enforcers, are in privity with other plaintiffs acting in the
same capacity. See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 250, at 1814 n.79.
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groups are only likely to act once government and private industry have al-
ready paid a substantial portion of detection costs.
Thus, citizen suits may represent lost opportunities for the EPA to pur-
sue alternative enforcement priorities. While agencies would not want to
exclude matters of high importance from their decisionmaking agendas, su-
pervision of enforcement agendas can reduce the amount of duplicitous in-
formation before an agency by excluding certain issues from
consideration.264 Likewise, excising the potential issues raised by private
enforcement proceedings from an agency's agenda can help to remove in-
tractable controversies from the decisionmaking agenda2 65 and create a
layer of insulation for non-political decisionmakers, ensuring that neutral
analysis or dialogue-rather than political afterthought-is the norm.
2. Information Problems.-Although politically accountable deci-
sionmakers must maintain the ability to supervise their agendas if delibera-
tion is to flourish, participation may provide more information for agency
decisionmakers in evaluating agenda issues and for participants in evaluat-
ing agency proposals and other participants' positions. Increases in partici-
pation may result in large increases not only in the number of persons or
groups before an agency, but also in the amount of information available to
decisionmakers and participants.
However, as the amount of information in a decisionmaking context
increases, agency decisionmakers are more likely to "miss the forest for the
trees. 266 The policymaking process consumes an enormous amount of in-
formation, and the costs of information analysis for agency decisionmaking
are high. The United States Forest Service, for example, spends more on
the information intensive process of forest planning than any other item in
its budget.267
264 Political parties, for example, are one institution that provide a way of channeling issues. The
literature on political parties suggests that "the value in confronting all issues must be balanced against
the mediation and consensus-forming benefits of coalitional politics, which in effect keep us unfocused
on the long-term or 'logical' implications of our actions." Fitts, supra note 122, at 955.
265 John Rawls suggests that a precondition to the stability of democratic processes is their will-
ingness to accept certain issues as beyond public concern for the decisionmaldng context. John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 251 (1985); see also PETER
C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 58 (1986) (increasing the number of partici-
pants in a democratic political process increases the probability of a voting cycle).
266 The value of limited information is widely discussed in organization theory. See DAVID
BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 53 (1963); JAMES G. MARCH &
HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 203-04 (1958); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 80-83
(1976); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1982); AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY
ANALYSIS 36 (1979).
267 A government-sponsored study suggested that the Forest Service spent at least $200 million
on planning for purposes of complying with the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning
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Although additional information is one of the primary rationales in fa-
vor of increasing the level of participation in agency decisions, the large
amounts of information provided by participants may adversely affect the
decisionmaking process by impairing the quality of the analysis and polar-
izing participants' preferences. The NEPA's information-intensive EIS
process268 illustrates how large-scale participation, increasing the quantity
of information available to decisionmakers, may also impair the quality of
agency decisions as measured by expertocratic, pluralist, or deliberative
democratic models. Although the NEPA's EIS process has undoubtedly
met some success in encouraging agencies to consider the effects of proj-
26
ects on the environment, 69 there are two potential problems associated with
mass participation in this context: first, it may discourage lay participation
and tempt decisionmakers to simplify or engage in shorthand scientific
analysis; and second, it may create additional opportunities for participants
to act strategically.
a. Information overload for decisionmakers.-To the extent that
critical, rational dialogue does occur among participants during the NEPA's
EIS process, the heavy scientific jargon that dominates the process makes it
difficult for ordinary citizens to engage in meaningful dialogue about an
EIS's substance.27° It has been observed that most citizen participation in
the EIS process occurs through interest groups.271 Although interest group
participation does not impair the quality of the decisionmaking process, it
makes citizen interaction less likely. This, in turn, makes it more likely that
interaction, to the extent it occurs, is confined to those who are the primary
conveyors of scientific information-agency and nonagency experts, or
powerful interest groups who can afford to finance their own scientific re-
search. Thus, to the extent the process is expertise-intensive, it may raise
some problems for pluralist decisionmaking, which values political bar-
gaining over scientific dialogue.
Act of 1974 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976, making "the cost of forest planning the
largest single item in the national forest system budget, edging out, in fiscal year 1988, such historical
and richly endowed programs as road construction ($171,764,000) and timber sales administration and
management ($185,561,000)." RIW. Behan, The RPA/NFMA: Solution to a Nonexistent Problem, 88 J.
FORESTRY 20,22,20-25 (1990).
268 This process is described in the text accompanying supra notes 100-08.
269 In 1990, the twentieth anniversary of NEPA, many law reviews published symposia cele-
brating NEPA's successes. See, eg., Symposium on NEPA at Twenty: The Past, Present and Future of
the National Environmental Policy Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990); Symposium, NEPA at Twenty, 25
LAND& WATERL REV. 1 (1990).
270 See Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decisionmaldng: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in
Environmental Agency Decisionmaking, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1111, 1118-19 (1991).
271 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 501,529, 531 (1989) ("Citizens did not participate-they joined or otherwise sup-
ported interest groups that participated on their behalf.").
225
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The EIS process also may interfere with the operation of expertocratic
and deliberative democracy decisionmaking models. Expertocratic models
may suffer because often the rationality of the analysis that occurs in the
EIS process is thwarted by too much information. Agency decisionmakers,
like individuals generally, face a "scarcity of attention."2 72 Although addi-
tional information is often helpful, sometimes it can change how a phe-
nomenon is perceived and evaluated.273  Too much information is also
likely to invite agency decisionmakers more readily to "satisfice"--to "look
for good enough solutions rather than insisting that only the best solutions
will do. 274 As agency decisionmakers increase their usage of heuristic de-
vices or shortcuts, rather than attempt to develop complete and accurate
analytical tools, they also increase the potential for error in their decisions.
Thus, in the absence of limitations on the amount of information, decision-
makers suffer information overload and are forced to simplify their models,
thwarting their ability to engage in complete and accurate rational analy-
SS275sis.27
Information overload may also give rise to operational problems for
the deliberative democracy decisionmaking model. Lay citizens sometimes
participate fully in the EIS process, although, when they do so, decision-
makers often tend to ignore their comments.276 To the extent that partici-
pants provide information during the EIS process, however, they often do
so in a manner that discourages civic discussion of values. According to
one commentator, "most comment letters from private individuals are either
emotional expressions of personal _preferences or form letters with the same
content but different signatures. ' 27  Moreover, the expertise-laden format
of the EIS may lead agency decisionmakers to view themselves primarily as
272 SIMON, supra note 123, at 94.
273 One way its does this is through a "dilution" effect. Irrelevant, nondiagnostic information
can weaken judgment or impression. See Henry Zuckier, The Dilution Effect: The Role ofthe Correla-
tion and the Dispersion of Predictor Variables in the Use of Nondiagnostic Information, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1163 (1982) (describing how subjects respond differently to narratives
detailing the same phenomenon but containing different amounts of information).
274 SIMON,, supra note 123, at 85.
275 According to Christopher Schroeder, "comprehensive rationality... reduces choice to an
analysis of the efficacy of available alternatives to achieve predetermined goals... inevitably entail[ing]
simplification, both in the specification of goals and in the modeling methods employed to predict the
extent to which alternatives achieve them.' Christopher Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 495, 502 n.29 (1986).
276 Young-Seok Oh, Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Statement Process: Pol-
icy Influence in Forest Service Land Management Planning 38 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northern Illinois University) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review). Contrast this with
public participation in agency rulemaking hearings: "Even a casual observer can easily note the empty
or near-empty hearing rooms and the frequently pointless interchanges that occur during agency rule-
making hearings." Marcus E. Ethridge, Procedures for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy:
An Assessment of Policy Effects, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 115, 123
(Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987).
277 Oh, supra note 276, at 38.
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facilitating the objective transfer of information, rather than choosing fun-
damental values or assessing the quality or integrity of the information ex-
changed.278
b. Opportunities for strategic behavior on behalf of partici-
pants&-Additional information provided by participation may confer po-
litical advantages on participants, creating additional opportunities for lay
participants to act strategically in the process. While this is probably not
fatal to pluralist decisionmaking cultures, it can raise problems for experto-
cratic and deliberative democracy models. Large-scale participation may
facilitate strategic or irrational behavior by participants, rather than civic
discussion among them. For example, in evaluating the environmental irn-
pact of a proposed decision, such as building a road through a heavily for-
ested area, conservationists may generate information about endangered
populations and environmental risks. While such information may be help-
ful to decisionmakers, it may also increase the support for conservation by
mobilizing participants who value knowledge of what may be jeopardized
by resource exploitation. For example, such information may induce active
participation in the process by the pharmaceutical industry in protecting
sources of biodiversity. Thus, credible and well-disseminated information
may increase awareness of risks among participants and the political pres-
sure of mobilized interests.
However, enhanced awareness of risks and mobilization of interest
groups will not always contribute to rational decisionmaking or benefit the
deliberative process. Rather than promoting dialogue and movement to-
ward consensus, additional information may have the effect of increasing
the divergence between participants' preferences and interests, or further
entrenching preexisting preferences and interests, as participants are en-
couraged to join predefined factions.279 For example, knowledge that a for-
est has precisely six million significant plant and animal species and two
278 Agency experts are often so immersed in their own professional norms that they are incapable
of recognizing objectives other than those implicit in their models. Susan M. Schectman, The 'Bambi
Syndrome: 'How NEPA 's Public Participation in Wildlife Management is Hurting the Environment, 8
ENVTL. L. 611, 633 (1978) (claiming that public participation which does not further the scientific ob-
jective of maximizing the biotic potential of a population is "incompatible with sound resource man-
agement"). But see Jonathon Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental
Policy Act's Processfor Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. REv. 53, 88 (1996) (describing the process
as a "political-pluralist battle" rather than an expertise-laden scientific discussion).
279 Large-scale participation creates enormous pressure for conformity to existing sub-groups. In
a classic set of experiments, Solomon Asch had undergraduate students say which of three lines was
longest; the subject students had to answer the question after all other members of the group-in col-
laboration with the experimenter-had given an incorrect answer. The subjects were more likely to give
the wrong answer if there were more confederates answering incorrectly before them. See ELuOT
ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 19-24 (7th ed. 1995). The tendency of participants in large groups to
act irrationally is well documented in other contexts. See CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF
EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS (1841).
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million cubic meters of marketable timber does not draw those concerned
with biodiversity any closer to those concerned with timber as an economic
resource. It has been observed that, in the context of analysis of forestry
data, "[t]he net effect of the information and valuation effort may be to po-
larize the positions, without contributing greater responsibility, balance, or
consensus to the formulation of resource management policy."80 EIS
hearings with large numbers of participants have been described as "mean-
ingless displays of ideological fervor that have no impact on policy or im-
plementation."2 81 By facilitating strategic action by participants, such as
additional delay and the obfuscation of issues, such information may work
to take additional agency time and resources without necessarily improving
the rationality of the final agency decision or the deliberative quality of the
decisionmaking process. Ultimately, delay may have the effect of killing
proposed projects or agency programs.
3. Impairing Collegiality.-Agency deliberative processes are not af-
fected by active citizen participation alone. Passive participation also in-
forms the public about the agency's decisionmaking process and its
proposed and final courses of action, thus improving citizen understanding
and, potentially, breeding responsible citizenship. However, passive par-
ticipation may also negatively affect the quality of agency decisionmaking
processes.
The federal Sunshine Act,2 2 for example, requires that all meetings
among members of multi-member commissions, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC), be held in public and with at least seven days advance publiQ
notice.283 A meeting is defined as "deliberations of at least the number of
individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency
where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposi-
tion of official agency business.' 28 4 Altogether, about fifty federal agencies
280 Healy & Ascher, supra note 68, at 13.
281 Ethridge, supra note 276, at 123. As Daniel Farber has noted, decisionmakers "systemati-
cally deviate from rationality in considering combinations of risks; they ignore background information
in assessing new data; and they are easily swayed by trivial changes in the presentation of information."
Daniel Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1035
(1989).
282 The federal Sunshine Act is briefly described supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
283 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(1) (1994). An agency must also designate the name and phone number of
the official responsible for responding to requests for information about a meeting. Id. Agencies, how-
ever, may decide to close a meeting or withhold information about a meeting pursuant to an exemption
provided in 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c), but only where a majority of the entire membership of the agency votes
to do so. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(d)(1).
284 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2). Some state sunshine acts go much further. In Florida, for instance, no
quorum is necessary for there to be a "meeting" subject to the open meeting requirements: any gather-
ing, whether formal or casual, of two or more members of an agency to discuss some matter on which
foreseeable action will be taken is subject to the open meeting requirements. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
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are subject to the Sunshine Act. However, agencies with single adminis-
trators, such as the EPA or Department of Interior, are not restricted from
having meetings between their high officers (for example, the Administra-
tor or Secretary) and agency staff at any time. The Sunshine Act contains
ten exemptions, 2 5 for the most part paralleling the exemptions in the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA),286 which ensures public access to agency
records. 2
87
This type of participation by observation affords the public an oppor-
tunity to learn about the agency decisionmaking process, forcing the proc-
ess into the sunshine. Sponsors of sunshine acts claim that, when in the
open and subject to passive participation by the public, decisionmaking
process will enjoy an increase in public confidence, promote greater under-
standing of agency decisions, and improve outcomes. 288 Participation in
this sense is conducive to better agency decisions to the degree that deci-
sionmakers are aware of public scrutiny, accountable for the proposals they
make, critique, and support or oppose, and publicly responsible for out-
comes. Open meetings thus may facilitate effective operation of pluralist
agency decisionmaking, to the extent they ensure public accountability to
regulatory deal making. For similar reasons, open meetings may facilitate
expertocratic decisionmaking, by allowing the public to scrutinize fully the
rationality of expertocratic decisions.
However, it has been observed that, in practice, the publicity provided
by such participation has impaired the sort of agency decisionmaking delib-
erative democratic models envision.8 9 For example, in a recommendation
issued in 1984, the Administrative Conference of the United States
286.011 (West 1997); FLORIDA ATrORNEY GENERAL, FLORIDA GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE
MANUAL 26 (1995).
285 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(l)-(10). Specifically, the Sunshine Act allows an agency to close meet-
ings when the agency determines that the meeting or the disclosure of information during the meeting is
likely to:
(1) disclose matters... of national defense or foreign policy...; (2) relate solely to the in-
ternal personnel rules and practices of an agency; ... (4) disclose trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;... (6) disclose infor-
mation of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy; (7) disclose [certain] investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses.
Id.
286 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
287 However there is one important FOIA exemption which is not available under the Sunshine
Act: the Sunshine Act contains no exemption for interagency and intra-agency "predecisional" memo-
randa and letters, as does the FOIA. Id. § 552(b)(5). Effectively, then, the Sunshine Act attempts to
draw lines based on mental processes, not materials in writing; intrapersonal mental processes can occur
without public scrutiny, but interpersonal dialogue must take place in the open.
288 See S. REP. No. 94-354, at 4-6 (1975).
289 A recent examination of public attitudes towards Congress attributes negative perceptions of
the institution to the fact that "the public does not like overly deliberate politics." HIBBING & THEISS-
MORSE, supra note 19, at 61.
229
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(ACUS) 290 noted that one of the most significant results of participation
provided by the Sunshine Act was a reduction in the collegial character of
the agency decisionmaking process.
291
Many federal agencies have expressed continuing concern that the
Sunshine Act has had a chilling effect on the willingness and ability of
agency decisionmakers to engage in collegial deliberations. 292  The Sun-
shine Act's requirements impair the ability of agency members to deliber-
ate, adversely affect the establishment of agency agendas, and promote
inefficient practices within agencies. 293 Responding to these and other con-
cerns, in 1995 ACUS established a Special Committee to Review the Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act.
294
The Sunshine Act's effects on agency deliberation are obvious. Private
discussions between agency members help promote collegiality which, in
turn, improves the quality of agency decisions. Decisionmakers, such as
agency heads, staff, and nonagency decisionmakers, play a referee role over
lay citizens' civic discussions of the issues.295 Judicial review of agency
action, for example, can be understood as "a meaningful dialogue between
[the] court and agency in which the court stands in for the knowledgeable
290 ACUS, dissolved in 1996, was an independent federal agency that conducted research, issued
reports, and made recommendations to the President, Congress, particular departments and agencies, and
the judiciary regarding the need for procedural reforms in administrative agencies. See
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT. Due to a termination
of funding by Congress, ACUS ceased operations on October 31, 1995. William Funk, R.I.P. A.C.U.S.,
21(2) ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1 (Winter 1996).
291 ACUS Recommendation 84-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-3 (1993).
292 See Letter from Steven M.H. Wallman, Commissioner with the SEC, to Thomasina Rogers,
Chairperson of ACUS (dated Feb. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Sunshine Letter] (on file with Northwestern
University Law Review). Commissioner Wallman's letter was joined by Reed E. Hundt, former Chair-
man of the FCC; Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC; Sheila Bair, Commissioner with the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission; Andrew Barnett, Commissioner with the FCC; Rachelle Chong, Commis-
sioner with the FCC; Susan Ness, Commissioner with the FCC; James H. Quello, Commissioner with
the FCC; Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioner with the SEC; Christine Vamey, Commissioner with the
FTC; Joseph Grundfest, Professor of Law at Stanford University and former SEC Commissioner (1985-
90); and Al Sommer, an attorney with Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and former SEC Commissioner (1973-
76).
293 See Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 3.
294 See Notice of Public Hearing Regarding the Government in the Sunshine Act, 60 Fed. Reg.
40,342 (1995). The Committee held open meetings from May to September, culminating in a public
hearing in September 1995, and produced a report in October 1995 making several recommendations.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SPECIAL COMM. TO REVIEW THE GOV'T IN THE
SUNSHINE ACT, REFORM OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT (Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter
ACUS SUNSHINE REPORT]. The main text of the Committee Report, without letters and exhibits, has
been published as Special Committee, Administrative Conference of the United States, Report & Rec-
ommendation By the Special Committee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 421 (1997). The full membership of ACUS did not have an opportunity to consider the report be-
fore the agency ceased operations.
295 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 46 (noting "the task of the legislator was very close to the
task of the citizen in the traditional republican conception").
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citizen that the agency must persuade to accept the regulatory policy.' 96
One of decisionmakers' most important tasks is "to ensure the flourishing
of the necessary public-spiritedness. 297 Decisionmakers have a responsi-
bility to guard the civic state, "prevent[ing] the government from degener-
ating into a clash of private interests. 298  In so doing, agency
decisionmakers, borrowing from the science of traditional expertocratic
models, utilize a host of tools to rationalize and explain the proposals they
consider and ultimately adopt.
Acc'ording to deliberative democrats, when Congress chooses to regu-
late an activity, such as environmental pollution, agency decisionmakers
cannot simply sit back and watch private interests solve their own prob-
lems. While consensus is ideal to deliberative democratic decisionmak-
ing,299 consensus is seldom likely among any other than the smallest groups
of persons.300 It is well-recognized that, as the number of participants in a
decisionmaking process increases, consensus becomes less likely. As Law-
rence Susskind notes,
while public participation requirements are embedded in most of the cur-
rent laws, they have not produced results that are sufficiently fair, effi-
cient, stable, and wise from the standpoint of the people affected by those
decisions. This has forced people into confrontational modes which ulti-
mately exhaust them, before even producing satisfactory outcomes. °1
29 Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1550.
297 Sunstein, supra note 139, at 36.
298 Id. According to Alexander Hamilton:
When occasions present themselves, in which the [objective] interests of the people are at variance
with their inclinations, it is the duty of the person, whom they have appointed to be the guardians
of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity
for more cool and sedate reflection.
THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 446-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1889). See also
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 55, 59 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 49 (James Madison).
M See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17,22-23
(Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) (noting that "ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally
motivated consensus," but there is no promise that this ideal will always be realized).
300 "There has been considerable public debate on the maximum number of people that should be
permitted in any one consensus-building process. Some believe that the number should not exceed fif-
teen. The process can work with fifty to a hundred participants, although it does require more work with
larger numbers." Remarks of Lawrence E. Susskind, in STANDING COMM. ON ENvTL. LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 45 (1994); see also
GASTIL, supra note 244; MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDIcrS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIzE AND SOCIAL
DECISION RULE 89-90 (1977).
301 Lawrence E. Susskind, Overview of Developments in Public Participation, in STANDING
COMM. ON ENVTL. LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONMAKING 2,5 (1994).
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If government or market processes could ensure that all participants in a de-
cisionmaking process, institutional and public, agree, administrative law
would lose most of its relevance to American governance.
Although consensus among all participants will seldom be possible,
some degree of coordination by decisionmakers internal to an agency deci-
sionmaking process is essential to sustaining the deliberative conception of
bureaucratic democracy.0 2 If agency decisionmakers themselves treat the
process as inherently political, in the pluralist sense, lay persons will also be
more likely do so. 303 Internal agency decisionmakers themselves 3°4 often
reach agreement on difficult issues.305 Although consensus among partici-
pants is seldom achievable,30 6 deliberative agency processes can attempt to
achieve a sense of collegiality in which decisionmakers, if they disagree,
openly state their reasons for disagreement. Such collegial processes, by
promoting an ethos of respect, also assure that the agency decisionmakers
themselves heed civic virtue.
However, under the Sunshine Act, discussions between agency mem-
bers that do not fall within one of the exemptions must be open to the pub-
lic. This has created what has been described as a "chilling effect" on
agency members' willingness to engage in open and creative discussions of
issues: "[M]embers are often isolated from one another, forced to deliber-
ate, at best, one-on-one or rely heavily on staff to communicate their con-
cerns to other members."307  As a result, agency members are unable to
adequately fulfill their delegated duties, for which the political process at-
tempts to hold them accountable.
Ironically, the Sunshine Act, which applies only to agencies with more
than one member, conflicts with the underlying rationale for establishing
302 See, e.g., Reagan & Fedor-Thurman, supra note 118, at 93 (noting substantial agency consen-
sus on policy directions as crucial to success in implementing energy conservation planning).
303 For instance, it has been observed in the context of congressional committee decisionmaking
that the use of a collegial staff may help to alleviate many of the informational problems caused by a
staff beholden to a committee chair. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES:
CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 99 (1980).
304 One problem with the literature on deliberative democracy is its failure to separate the deci-
sionmakers from the participants in agency processes. See supra note 295. The oversight is understand-
able: for deliberative democrats, participants' motives merge with those of the institutional
decisionmakers, as participants transcend their own private interests and reflect on the public interest.
However, in the real world, self-interest of some sort is seldom absent from the process. Institutions
cannot hope for civic engagement in every instance; rather, the best institutions can do is hope to create
the conditions under which civic engagement will develop.
305 See Reagan & Fedor-Thurman, supra note 118, at 93.
306 See SINSTEIN, supra note 170, at 247.
307 Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 4; see also David M. Welbor et al., The Federal Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act and Agency Decisionmaking, ADMIN. & SOC'Y 475 (Feb. 1989) (observing
that, under the Sunshine Act, most important agency decisions have not emerged from authentic colle-
gial decisions).
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independent agencies. 30 Multimember, independent agencies were created
by Congress to provide collegial decisionmaking where the collective
thought process of many tenured, independent appointees with differing
viewpoints (even where these viewpoints are controversial) would be better
than a single appointee's decisions.0 9 The Sunshine Act inadvertently
transforms multiheaded agencies into entities which tend to function as if
headed by a number of individual, independently-acting members31
The Sunshine Act also thwarts the ability of agency members to con-
sider and establish an agency's agenda.31 ' Agency members may be reluc-
tant to meet privately with an agency head to develop an agency agenda, for
fear that discussions may evolve to the point where the Sunshine Act is im-
plicated. Thus, agency heads "are frequently required to determine an
agency's agenda without the benefit of the collective guidance of the mem-
bers."12 In considering and establishing an agency's agenda, staff mem-
bers are similarly affected, as they may have difficulty "ascertaining clearly
the thinking of members and relating the views of one member to those of
others."
313
The Sunshine Act's restrictions on closed meetings also encourage
agencies to engage in inefficient practices and procedures. Agencies af-
firmatively attempt to avoid situations in which members could be deemed
to have "deliberated" or to have engaged in meetings "that determine or re-
sult in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business. 314 Be-
cause of the difficulty in distinguishing between preliminary conversations,
which are outside of the Sunshine Act's requirements, 315 and deliberations,
which must be held in public, many agencies simply prohibit the gathering
of a quorum of agency members. Since the Sunshine Act only applies to
308 Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 4.
309 See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941).
310 See Thomas H. Tucker, "Sunshine"--The Dubious New God, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 541
(1980).
311 The importance ofagenda setting is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 245-59.
312 Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 4.
313 Welbom et at., supra note 307, at 476.
314 The restrictions of the Sunshine Act are triggered only where there is as a "meeting" within
the meaning of the Act. There are four basic requirements for a meeting: (1) a quorum of agency mem-
bers, (2) acting jointly, (3) to conduct deliberations, (4) that result in the disposition of official agency
business. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (1994).
315 This difficulty was one of which Congress was aware in drafting the Sunshine Act. Congress
ultimately substituted the language "deliberations that result in .. ." for the previously suggested lan-
guage "deliberations that concern," in an attempt to exclude general discussions that "concern" agency
business but do not determine or result in the adoption of a firm position on an issue. See RICHARD K.
BERG & STEPHEN H. KLITZMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, AN
INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT 7-8 (1978).
316 ,Agency Members, and agency general counsel who advise them, are understandably-and
appropriately--concerned about engaging in discussions with a quorum of agency members that could
be perceived, even arguably, as crossing the line, even though the discussions may, in fact, not dispose
92:173 (1997)
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agency "meetings,' 31 7 it may have resulted in an increased willingness of
agency members to use written memoranda to express their views to one
another. 8 In addition, in order to avoid the notice and other procedural re-
quirements of the Sunshine Act, agencies are now more likely to vote on
agency agenda matters by "notation" or "seriatim" rather than in open
meetings. Many agency commissioners have grown to rely on intermedi-
aries to discuss agency business in order to avoid triggering the require-
ments of the Sunshine Act. For example, staff members, including legal
counsel for agency members, may meet to discuss the issues that ultimately
will require a decision by their politically accountable principals. This is
not an efficient decisionmaking mechanism, as several such meetings are
necessary to make even the most minor decisions, and comprehension and
interpretation problems, which further hinder agency decisions, occur fre-
quently.
320
All of these deliberative "costs" might be justified if the Sunshine Act
resulted in significant benefits by increasing public participation in agency
decisionmaking. While the Sunshine Act's requirements may have resulted
in increased public understanding of agency actions and their results, it is
questionable whether it has increased the public's understanding of the de-
cisionmaking process.
Consider agency rulemaking. The public is allowed to provide com-
ments on proposed agency rules pursuant to the notice and comment provi-
sions of the APA. On occasion, open meetings during rulemaking
proceedings involve substantive discussions and deliberations that are edu-
of official agency business." ACUS SUNSHINE REPORT, supra note 294, at 2. See also Sunshine Letter,
supra note 292, at 5. Even one-on-one meetings are prohibited if the agency has three or fewer mem-
bers, as the SEC currently does. For example, at the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion, a quorum consists of two commissioners and commission members have been very reluctant to talk
to any other member outside of public meetings, for fear that if seen together they might be perceived as
violating the Sunshine Act. According to OSHA Chairman Stuart E. Weisberg, "In an attempt to over-
come this handicap, commission members communicate with each other indirectly through others, usu-
ally through their respective counsels, which is a cumbersome process at best." Marcia Coyle, Agencies
Ask for Less Sunshine, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at A12.
317 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (1994).
318 See Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 6.
319 ACUS SUNSHINE REPORT, supra note 294, at 2. The ACUS recommended that Congress
amend the Sunshine Act "to require agencies subject to the Act to develop and publish rules or policy
statements outlining their procedure for notation voting and the types of issues for which it will normally
be used." Id. at 6. See also HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON GOV'T MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION AND
TECHNOLOGY, June 13, 1996 (statement of Randolph J. May) (summarizing ACUS recommendations
on the Sunshine Act).
320 "Another consequence of the [Sunshine] Act has been that it encourages the deliberative pro-
cess to be conducted by and through the staff of the agency members, enhancing the power of the inter-
mediary staff members vis-a-vis the agency member and, perhaps, reducing the accountability of
appointed agency members." ACUS SUNSHINE REPORT, supra note 294, at 3. See also Sunshine Letter,
supra note 292, at 6 n.15.
321 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
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cative to the public. However, as many independent agency members have
observed, in general the benefit the public receives from such meetings "is
limited to observing final statements regarding agency decision making
rather than the deliberations with respect to the matter at issue.' ,322 Such
meetings are quite short-some last less than one hour for multiple matters.
In addition, there is much premeeting coordination between agency mem-
bers and staff,32 allowing for little spontaneous and thorough exchange of
views.3 24 Where matters are discussed, "it is frequently in a cursory manner
that is for the record, rather than to further the deliberative process. ' '325 To
the extent that the Sunshine Act was designed to allow the public to see the
process by which agency decisions are made, in contrast to the results of
agency action, it has utterly failed to achieve this purpose.326
To suggest that less participation, even of the passive type, may im-
prove the quality of agency decisionmaking seems counterintuitive or, in-
deed, elitist. Yet in other areas of life, it is well-recognized that there are
times when the public might prefer to be less informed. Most people, for
example, would prefer to be ignorant about one major piece of quite per-
sonal information-the specific date of their own death. While adminis-
trative procedure may not present the stark choices comparable to the
invocation of one's death, some degree of ignorance by participants may be
acceptable in a democracy.
328
Joseph Bessette, a political scientist, cites as an example of deliberative
secrecy the Reagan administration's plan to reform the tax code in the di-
rection of a modified income tax in 1984 and 1985, one of the chief eco-
322 Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 7.
323"In many instances the opening statements and questions of agency members are either pre-
pared by or shared with staffprior to the meeting to allow them to formulate appropriate responses." Id.
324 Steven M.H. Wallman, an SEC Commissioner, described agency open meetings under the
Sunshine Act as "short, scripted and perfunctory events involving no deliberation among agency offi-
cials." Coyle, supra note 316, at A12.
32 Sunshine Letter, supra note 292, at 8; Welbom et al., supra note 307, at 471; see also ACUS
Recommendation 84-3, supra note 291 (noting that discussion in open meetings is sometimes inade-
quate to allow those in attendance to fully understand the proceedings); Tucker, supra note 310, at 543
("because federal decision-making meetings represent merely the end result of what is often a very long
process dealing with complex issues, opening such meetings will be generally not only unenlightening,
but also boring to even a highly intelligent spectatoer").
326 Cf ACUS SUNSHINE REPORT, supra note 294, at 3 ("the Committee is concerned that the
public is neither receiving the enhanced access to the governmental decisionmaking process that the Act
envisioned, nor.., is it receiving the benefit of better agency decisions through collegial decisionmak-
ing").
327 See Fitts, supra note 122; William T. Fitts, Jr. & Barbara Fitts, Ethical Standards of the
Medical Profession, 297 ANNALS 17, 25 (1955); see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 21 (1989) (observing how too much information can affect the quality of speech);
ROGER SHATTUCK, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE: FROM PROMETHEUS TO PORNOGRAPHY 327-42 (1996)
(summarizing categories of knowledge in which less information may be desirable).
32 Cf. Reich, supra note 80.
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nomic initiatives of Reagan's second term. 329 Treasury Secretary Regan
met regularly with a group of ten advisors and high-level Treasury officials
in 1984, keeping this group isolated from the storms of the 1984 election
campaign. According to Bessette, "[t]he secrecy insisted upon by Regan ef-
fectively screened out political influences on deliberative process." 3 ° Al-
though Regan's plan was submitted to Congress, it was not endorsed by the
President nor adopted. Instead, a plan introduced by Regan's successor,
James Baker, was introduced to Congress and adopted into law in 1986.
Baker's plan, unlike Regan's, was a political compromise made in the open,
restoring enough tax breaks to keep a coalition of interests from killing the
bill. According to Bessette, the result was a tax reform law not based on the
merits of reform, but on the "political forces and prospects for passage. 331
Yet, Bessette observes, "[t]o the extent that secrecy may promote delibera-
tion, the executive branch has a distinct advantage over the Congress, where
the norm and the public expectation is an open decisionmaking process. 332
Sunshine laws take this advantage away. Apart from specifically identified
categorical exceptions, sunshine laws do not allow an agency to give rea-
sons for deliberating outside of the sunshine. Thus, sunshine laws may not
even satisfy advocates of publicity in the deliberative process.333
C. Participation s Constitutive Effects on Agency Selection of a
Decisionmaking Model
Increased participation not only impairs the operative quality of deci-
sionmaking in agency cultures that are decisively expertocratic, pluralist, or
deliberative democratic, but also creates incentives for a decisionmaker to
make a constitutive shift away from a deliberative democratic decision-
making culture and towards expertocratic or pluralist models. An agency's
decisionmaking culture is influenced by the level and types of participation
the agency provides. This results because the perceived value of participa-
tion will affect an agency's institutional allocation of resources.
For example, in an agency context providing for mass participation,
agency decisionmakers may opt to delegate tough decisions to the experts,
329 JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 206 (1994).
330 Id. at 207.
331 Id. at 208.
332 Id. at 209.
333 Gutmann and Thompson are less sanguine than Bessette about the value of deliberative se-
crecy in the executive branch. They cite as an example the Clinton Administration's Task Force on Na-
tional Health Care Reform, which held secret meetings to develop a national health care policy in 1993.
Ultimately, a federal district court required that the names of Task Force experts be disclosed and that
meetings be open. American Ass'n of Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82
(D.D.C. 1993). Gutmann and Thompson thus suggest that deliberative secrets themselves be the subject
of some deliberative process in order to meet their publicity principle. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 163, at 116-17.
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encouraging a shift toward expertocratic decisionmaking, rather than de-
ciding to invest resources in the difficult and expensive task of developing
deliberation among large groups of participants. Alternatively--or perhaps
also--participation may, where interests are strongly held, escalate deci-
sionmaking into a pluralist mode in which decisionmakers are forced to
treat the process as a simple political compromise of preexisting prefer-
ences. As participation increases, decisionmakers may also find appealing
the value skepticism that underlies pluralist decisionmaking models.
1. Lapsing into Expertocratic Decisionmakin.-Although it often
may fail to meet the deliberative democratic goals, the EIS process has
been described as an example of expertocratic decisionmaking. While in
form, the NEPA calls for a "systematic interdisciplinary" planning process
to evaluate environmental impacts,335 in practice, the EIS process relies
heavily upon scientific experts and other professionals. A mere assertion of
an interest by a citizen participant in the decisionmaking process does not
require a response by an agency unless it is expressed in data or statements
that challenge the scientific basis of an EIS. 36 And, indeed, some have ob-
served that very little critical dialogue occurs among lay participants or
between lay participants and agency personnel during the EIS process. The
typical exchange fostered by NEPA participation takes place with respect to
a draft EIS statement, which allows for a response from a participant and an
agency's reply. If a public hearing is scheduled, it allows for scant critical
exchange: typically the agency gives a short presentation followed by audi-
ence testimony.337
The record of decision, which lays out the reasons for an agency's de-
cision, is only released at the end of the EIS process and is not widely pub-
licized or utilized.338  Its expertise-laden scientific format may encourage
334 See Poisner, supra note 278.
335 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1994).
336 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
337 Consider the following two reflections on the non-dialogical participation provided during
the EIS hearing process:
While plenty of opportunity exists to speak and submit written comments, members of the public
may feel that their opinions are little more than chits on a tally sheet: 'Just try to argue with your
forester today. No matter what outrageous thing you say, he "appreciates your concern" and is
"glad to have your input." But he isn't listening, he's counting.'
Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a Community of Values, 14 PuB. LAND L. REV.
81, 91 (1993) (quoting William 0. McLamey, Forest Planning Voices Unheard, AM. FORESTS, May-
June 1989, at 14).
We are not able to sit down at a table with industry and the PCA [Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency] and have an open discussion. Instead, we drive 120 miles, take a day offwork from ourjobs, pay large babysitting fees and have the PCA tell us we have 15 minutes total to talk.
Bray, supra note 270, at 1134 n.100.
338 See VALARIE M. FOGELMAN, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
INTERPRETATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND COMPLIANCE 122 (1990).
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passivity by many citizens. One author has noted that, at best, citizens walk
away from the process feeling as if it was dominated by experts and that
they had no opportunity to participate.339 Thus, the high levels of participa-
tion provided by the EIS process may have led agency decisionmakers to
shift to expertocratic decisionmaking, trading deliberation for rationality.
340
2. Regressing into Pluralism.-Special interests, the modem-day vari-
ant of Madison's "factions," are often reactive-rather than proactive-re-
spondents to regulatory policy. Fishkin, reflecting on how technology has
influenced democratic decisionmaking in America, idealizes ancient Athe-
nian politics, which relied heavily on representatives elected by public face-
to-face deliberation.341 Fishkin contrasts this with an alternative model of
democracy: ancient Sparta, in which representatives were elected by "the
Shout."342 With increases in mass participation facilitated by technology,
Fishkin fears, the Spartan rather than Athenian ideal is being realized: "The
sting of an offensive sound bite arouses a populace that is only sound-
bitten. The ire of talk-show democracy has given us a mass electronic ver-
sion of the Shout.,
343
In a similar manner, direct participation in selecting agency enforce-
ment priorities, as with citizen suits, encourages parties to assert their non-
reflexive preferences in the agency decisionmaking process. 344  While
closing off lay participation altogether might favor expertocratic models,
the approach of citizen suits--opening up the process to any person or en-
tity who asserts transgression of environmental laws-may have encour-
aged more pluralism in the administrative process while thwarting the
emergence of a truly deliberative process. Interest groups, some of which
339 See Poisner, supra note 278, at 90. But see James R. Richardson, Negotiating Community
Consensus in Preparing Environmental Impact Statements, in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS
139 (J. Walton Blackburn & Will Marie Bruce eds., 1995) (describing successes of a negotiated EIS
process in Prescott, Arizona).
3) Although William Funk gives several negative anecdotal stories about NEPA's performance
in the energy context, he concludes by suggesting that NEPA works 'Just the way it was intended."
William Funk, NEPA at Energy: An Exercise in Legal Narrative, 20 ENVTL. L. REV. 759, 768-71
(1990). Despite negative anecdotes about NEPA's success, many share Funk's optimism. A classic
study concludes that when agencies allow scientists to explore a broad range of alternatives, all projects
benefit from inexpensive environmental mitigation measures. In addition, projects with "the greatest
environmental costs and little political support' are eliminated. SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING
BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 251
(1984). The reduction in the number of NEPA lawsuits filed in recent years may be interpreted as evi-
dence that the process has begun to work well. See 1994 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:
24TH ANNUAL REPORT 368-69 (noting that 1238 NEPA cases were filed between 1974 and 1983, aver-
aging 124 cases per year, while 714 were filed between 1984 and 1992, averaging 79 per year).
341 FISHKIN, supra note 88, at 18-19.
342 On "the Shout," see supra note 210 and accompanying text.
343 FISHKIN, supra note 88, at 24-25.
3 See KINGDON, supra note 90, at 69 (public opinion may compel government to do something,
but more often it stops it from doing something).
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have benefited from citizen suits, use such mechanisms as blunt instruments
to remove their battles from the administrative process and into courts. To
the extent that dialogue and deliberation occur because of citizen suits, it is
in the judicial, not the administrative, process.3 45
The type of participation provided by citizen suits is undesirable to the
extent that it fails to provide for engaged deliberation based in communica-
tive action, instead encouraging strategic behavior by litigants. Agency de-
cisionmakers have too great an incentive to make a constitutive shift away
from deliberative democracy and towards pluralist models. By analogy,
consider research into jury deliberations. Research has found that individ-
ual jurors are more likely to be persuaded. to take a position if they have
heard a greater number of arguments in favor of that position.3 46  Voting
during jury deliberations-expressing preferences-can have the opposite
effect: voting too early or too frequently promotes conflict.347 By contrast,
if jurors discuss the evidence together they are more likely to come to a
consensus and to arrive at a more accurate recollection of the facts.348
While such deliberation delays formal expression of preferences, it can lead
to more complete. reflection about preferences. Thus, it is more conducive
to goals of consensus. Consensus solutions are more legitimate than mere
preference aggregation or mechanisms that allow immediate preference ex-
pression. Because individual enforcers, such as those who bring citizen
suits, are not politically accountable, citizen suits provide no check against
strategic action.349
345 Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997). In Bennett, ranch operators and irrigation districts
in Oregon sued the United States government under the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision
for the government's failure to follow the ESA's consultation provisions and its failure to consider eco-
nomic considerations before imposing a limit on water levels. The Ninth Circuit refused to allow the
plaintiffs, who were opposed to protecting certain affected species offish, to sue under the ESA because
they were outside of the zone of interests the ESA was intended to protect. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d
915, 921 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ESA's broad citizen suit provi-
sion negated the Court's prudential zone of interest standing limitation. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162-63.
Bennett resonates for a discussion of the deliberative democratic shortcoming of citizen suits for
several reasons. First, it illustrates the strategic behavior of certain citizen suit litigants. Second, it is
noteworthy that the plaintiffs in Bennett were suing to stop, not start or contribute to, government regu-
lation. Third, the dialogue that did occur in Bennett initially was a legalistic one, as the lower court was
forced to glean legislative intent in order to get the desired result.
346 See Bobby J. Calder et al., The Relation of Cognitive and Memorial Process to Persuasion in
a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (1974); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Jury
Deliberations: Discussion Content and Influence Processes in Jury Decision Making, 16 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 322,344 (1986).
347 See RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACnCE 193 (1986).
348 See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 85 (1988).
349 By contrast, centralized executive control over enforcement would provide more opportunity
for congressional oversight. See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 250, at 1808. While the above analysis
focuses primarily on citizen suits against private polluters, it has been observed that citizen suits against
the government pose even "more of a threat to principles of accountability and representativeness" Id.
at 1819.
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In addition, a pluralist story might be told about the NEPA's EIS proc-
ess. Prior to the passage of NEPA, the agency decisionmaking process was
biased towards certain private interests, while other interests were ignored.
The NEPA, by opening up the process to citizen participation in the form of
review and comment, helped to even the playing field for pluralist political
exchange. Not surprisingly, the result has been described as "a confusing
hybrid of pluralism and synopticism": the EIS process-and its output, the
EIS and the record of decision-meets the format of comprehensive ration-
ality, but this form "overlays a decision-making situation that is usually plu-
ralist in orientation. 35 °  Increases in participation create incentives for
agencies to delegate tough political choices to experts. This may lead to a
shift towards expertocratic models, but in the case of EIS statements it also
encourages pluralist behavior on behalf of participants who may gain in-
formation in the process and exploit it for strategic purposes, such as de-
lay.351 It has also been observed that, rather than encouraging dialogue and
a reflexive examination of citizen preferences, the EIS process breeds dis-
trust and cynicism about government, encouraging even more selfishness
and strategic behavior on behalf of participants.31
2
Moreover, although citizens may participate in the EIS process through
interest groups, there is little evidence that these groups are representative
of all significantly affected sectors of the community. Rather, it is more
likely the case that, when hearings on an EIS are held, only those with a
disproportionately strong interest in the outcome are in attendance. 3
The relationship between increases in participation and a lopsided plu-
ralist decisionmaking process is well-established.354  Agency experience
with the more elaborate citizen participation requirements of the 1960s was
generally regarded as a failure, in part due to the narrow range of interests
that actually availed themselves of access to agency proceedings. 355 In the
350 Poisner, supra note 278, at 85.
351 Funk observes that, in one context, NEPA has worked to provide an environmental analysis
to make the job of challengers easier, not to help the agency itself choose the best environmental alter-
native. Funk, supra note 340, at 762-63.
352 See Bray, supra note 270, at 1118-19.
353 See Poisner, supra note 278, at 92.
354 Mashaw notes,
although the participatory approach seems to presume that the process of decision can be made
open and neutral, it seems rather more likely that, with respect to many areas of administrative
policy formulation, certain interests, because of their intensity, resources and organization, will
come to dominate even an open decisionmaking process. Or to put the point somewhat differently,
interests that are substantially affected might, because of lack of resources or organization, fail to
participate effectively in administrative forums.
MASHAW, supra note 1, at 23-24.
355 See Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 356. Most participants, according to Rosenbaum, "tend to-
ward the well-educated, affluent middle- to upper-class individuals." Id. at 372. See also D. Stephen
Cupps, Emerging Problems of Citizen Participation, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 478,481 (1977) (noting that
many spokespersons for the environment are pursuing "middle and upper class concerns which are ad-
dressed for the most part at the expense of the poor, the aged, and urban and ethnic minorities").
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environmental protection area, citizen participation fell far short of expec-
tations. Despite a vigorous effort, for example, the EPA's Water Quality
Workshops did not succeed in generating more than negligible representa-
tion from a broad range of interests.356 A quantitative study of the relation-
ship between the "openness" of state administrative procedures and the
"aggressiveness" of state environmental regulation confirms these findings;
participatory reforms were most strongly associated with the strictness of
emissions standards in states where lobbying groups were the weakest.357
V. REGULATING PARTICIPATION TO ENHANCE DELIBERATION
I have argued that some institutions of contemporary administrative
law may have provided for too much mass participation, in part because
participation impairs ordinary agency decisionmaking, regardless of the
specific political-theoretic model, and in part because, at the constitutive
level, participation may adversely affect institutional decisions to structure
decisionmaking around a deliberative democratic model. While indiscrimi-
nate participation in agency decisions may allow governmental institutions
to mitigate monopoly rents from the political process and produce quality
information to a degree, it is not always a positive good. At some point,
participation begins to interfere with-and subverts-deliberative values.
To the extent that these values are fundamental to legitimate agency gov-
ernance, as they are for deliberative democratic models, the tension between
participation and deliberation must be addressed.
If deliberative decisionmaking is to succeed in practice, administrative
law-and political theory-must recognize that while participation has
many benefits, in some instances the costs of participation for bureaucratic
deliberation are simply too high. The examples of citizen suits, the EIS
process, and sunshine laws are illustrative but not exhaustive.58 Adminis-
trative procedure has become too participatory, at the cost of deliberative
bureaucratic government.
To the extent that the ideals of deliberative democracy are important, a
reorientation of administrative process could help to implement a balance
between the sometimes conflicting ideals of participation and deliberation.
One proposal is to require Congress or agencies to establish lay "juries"
which have regular input to, but not complete authority over, agenda devel-
opment or enforcement choices. Ronald Wright, for example, notes that in
the nineteenth century grand juries not only considered criminal indictments
356 See Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 372. Moreover, "eight of every ten participants were likely
to be government officials or consultants to government bodies." Id. at 374.
357 See Marcus E. Ethridge, The Policy Impact of Citizen Participation Requirements: A Com-
parative State Study, 10 AM. POL. Q. 489, 503 (1982).
358 Although this Article has presented only selective examples, a similar analysis could be ap-
plied to other participatory mechanisms of governance, such as negotiated rulemaking, citizen boards,
blue ribbon panels, and advisory commissions.
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but also performed a variety of functions that included policy initiation. 9
Such panels have been utilized to address even the most complex scientific
issues, such as DNA research, and their results have been praised in that
context,3 ° and they have been recommended as a way of encouraging more
deliberative democratic participation. 6'
Alternatively, to allow more reasoned citizen input, decisionmakers
could utilize focus groups or survey instruments to obtain public input.
3 62
The Public Agenda Foundation, an organization intended to encourage rep-
resentatives to make informed decisions about regulatory policy, has cre-
ated Citizen Review Panels, designed to synthesize both lay jury and survey
techniques. These experiments led lay participants to change their views on
scientific issues, bridged the gap between lay and scientific attitudes, and
helped to identify common and differing values.6 3
However, proposals to involve citizens directly in the agency decisions
process do not address the fundamental issue of whether such mechanisms
will be treated as courts-with decisionmaking authority--or advisory pan-
els-which could only hold hearings and render advice. 364  Nor do such
proposals consider the issue of who, among the relevant community, is the
best representative to participate in this capacity,365 or whether selection for
such mechanisms, much as selection for a jury, is to be random.
The tension between participation and deliberation, inherent to delib-
erative democratic theory, is also apparent in the practice of many adminis-
359 Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 466-75
(1992).
360 As Bruce Jennings notes:
mhe deliberations of the [recombinant DNA] citizen's advisory group demonstrated that
when a participatory body is given sufficient time, information, and opportunity to make decisions
that will have a real impact on issues that truly matter to the participants, it can achieve a high
level of sophistication and understanding. And it can produce decisions and recommendations on
complex technological problems that are as well informed and reasonable as those made by expert,
professional elites.
Bruce Jennings, Representation and Participation in the Democratic Governance of Science and Tech-
nology, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 223, 240 (Malcolm L. Goggin
ed., 1986) (emphasis added).
361 See Poisner, supra note 278, at 93.
362 See Katharine K. Baker, Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural
Resources and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOL. L. Q. 677 (1995); Lester W. Milbrath, Citi-
zen Surveys as Citizen Participation Mechanisms, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 478 (1981).
363 CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, RISK AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING 92-93 (1993).
364 These issues receive excellent treatment in Levmore, supra note 195.
365 This issue is raised in Dale Whittington & Duncan MacRae, Jr., The Issue of Standing in
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 665 (1986). According to Whittington &
MacRae, "[slociety places moral bounds on the application of cost-benefit calculations by not granting
standing to certain individuals or to the preferences of certain individuals in specific situations." Id. at
668. In their view, it is quite possible for participants in the cost-benefit process to speak on behalf of
non-participants' interests; indeed, they observe, this happens often to the extent that decisionmakers are
called on to consider the welfare of future generation or individuals in other countries. Id.
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trative processes. But the tension is not solvable by mere institutional tink-
ering. Deliberative democracy lives a paradoxical life: in order to be delib-
erative democratic, administrative procedure must provide for large
amounts of participation; yet, I have argued, if there is too much participa-
tion, administrative procedure is no longer deliberative democratic.
While it seems counterintuitive to suggest that less participation may
make administrative governance more-not less-democratic, such propos-
als have been advocated in other legal contexts, including within civil pro-
cedure and First Amendment jurisprudence. Owen Fiss, for example, has
suggested that, in the context of structural decrees issued to end racial dis-
crmination, "[i]t may be necessary to forgo the right of participation and to
leave various individuals with no other assurance that their interests will be
adequately represented., 366 Fiss criticizes Justice Rehnquist's decision in
Martin v. Wilks,367 holding that white firefighters are entitled to participate
in a proceeding to formulate a structural decree to end racial discrimination
against blacks in the Birmingham, Alabama, fire department. Unlike
Rehnquist, who embraces a "right to participation,, 368 Fiss urges focus on a
"right of representation"--"not a day in court but the right to have one's
interest adequately represented." 69
In a similar manner, Ronald Dworkin has recently urged a reduction of
emphasis upon participation in the First Amendment context. According to
Dworkin, "each citizen must have a fair and reasonably equal opportunity
not only to hear the views of others as these are published or broadcast, but
to command attention for his own views, either as a candidate for office or
as a member of a politically active group committed to some program or
conviction."370 In addition, Dworkin recognizes that "the tone of public
discourse must be appropriate to the deliberations of a partnership or joint
venture rather than the selfish negotiations of commercial rivals or military
enemies.,'37' Reasoning from these two premises, Dworkin suggests that
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,3 72 which held that man-
datory limitations on campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment,
should be overruled3 73 or circumvented.374 Not surprisingly, Fiss has made
366 Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 979 (1993).
367 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
368 Fiss, supra note 366, at 967.
369 Id. at 971. As Fiss acknowledges, it is his objective "to free due process from the grips of an
overly individualistic conception of due process and to acknowledge that the fairness of procedures in
part turns on the social ends that they serve." Id at 979.
370 Ronald Dworkin, The Curse ofAmerican Politics, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct
17, 1996, at 19, 23.
371 id.
372 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
373 Dworkin, supra note 370, at 24 (contending that "the case for overruling Buckley is a strong
one.").
92:173 (1997)
HeinOnline  -- 92 Nw. U. L. Rev.  243 1997-1998
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
some similar arguments in the First Amendment context. Although Fiss
does not expressly suggest that Buckley v. Valeo be overruled or disre-
garded, Fiss has also urged that the participatory value of free expression be
balanced with deliberative value of political equality. 75
As in the civil procedure and First Amendment contexts, administra-
tive law might advance other goals, such as deliberation, if it were to reduce
its current emphasis on increasing access points, designed to facilitate in-
creased mass participation. A reorientation, considering who best repre-
sents the community in agency decisionmaking processes, might be in
order. Indeed, until deliberative democracy addresses the issue of repre-
sentation, it is unlikely to present a compelling alternative to expertocratic
and pluralist decisionmaking models. Although this Article can do no more
than sketch a framework for discussion, two fundamental questions seem
paramount. First, who represents whom in the administrative process?
Second, what is the role of the representative?
376
The issue of who represents whom depends upon a theory of represen-
tation. It is accurate as a descriptive matter to say that representation al-
ready does occur in administrative proceedings, to the extent that interest
groups are active in decisionmaking. If a descriptive conception of repre-
sentation is adopted, individuals or entities who share identical interests
with other group members serve as proxies or exemplars for each group
member.3 77  "The representative does not act for others; he 'stands for'
them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resem-
blance or reflection.,,378  For example, a trade group representative may
stand for the interests of its industry members in the regulatory process. A
descriptive conception of representation would simply require regulators to
count affected interests and proportion representation in the decisionmaking
process accordingly.
374 "The decision did not declare a valuable principle that we should hesitate to circumvent. On
the contrary, it misunderstood not only what free speech really is but what it really means for free people
to govern themselves." Id.
375 According to Fiss:
In some instances, instrumentalities of the state will try to stifle free and open debate, and
the First Amendment is the tried-and-true mechanism that stops or prevents such abuses of state
power. In other instances, however, the state may have to act to further the robustness of public
debate in circumstances where the power outside the state are stifling speech.... It may even
have to silence the voices of some in order to hear the voices of others.
OwEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3-4 (1996).
376 Paul Brest, early in the civic republican constitutional debate, recognized this issue as funda-
mental. See Brest, supra note 84.
377 Descriptive representation has been described as representation by culturally or physically
similar persons. See Bernard Grofinan, Should Representatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?, in
REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 97 (Bernard Grofmian ed., 1982); see also SAMUEL
KRiSLOV, REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY (1974). For critique of this concept of representation in the
voting rights context, see Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory
of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1102-09 (1991).
378 HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1967).
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But the descriptive conception of representation contains some obvious
shortcomings. Its effectiveness depends on a tight relationship between the
characteristics of the representative and the group. It is also premised on a
fundamental myth-that a group is defined by a static and uniform set of
interests that can be preidentified. But, if such a group can be said to exist,
any individual member of the group can equally serve as a group represen-
tative; representation for the group, in other words, is arbitrary. At the
same time, individual group members who do not agree with the position
articulated by the representative are frozen out of the decisionmaking proc-
ess.
3 79
An alternative conception of representation---"acting for"--presents a
more dynamic account of representation, one that is certain to appeal to
theorists of deliberative democracy. Appointed judges, for example, have
been called representatives. But appointed judges do not merely stand for
their appointee, the public at large, or the law; rather they act in an autono-
mous, deliberative manner that mediates the interests of all of these con-
stituents.3'o This conception avoids the group homogeneity problem of
descriptive representation.
This second conception of representation requires that the second
question-the role of the representative-also be addressed.3 1 The repre-
sentative's role under a pluralist decisionmaking model is best described as
preference aggregation; however, within a deliberative democracy model,
the representative plays an important mediating role between individuals
and entities and the regulatory agency. Representatives must enable indi-
vidual group members to gain access to the contents of the deliberative
agency decisionmaking process, while also expressing to agency decision-
makers a group position.
Formal mechanisms that force limitations on participation, such as me-
diation, have worked to encourage deliberative decisionmaking by ad-
dressing the issue of representation, not by allowing indiscriminate,
immediate participation.382  In a consensual dispute-resolution model, a
third-party facilitator is typically selected to assist stakeholders in the delib-
379 See Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 1003 (1993) [here-
inafter Participation]. Sturm, building on her previous work, takes Fiss to task for failing to unpack his
premises about the nature of participation and representation at the remedial stage of public law litiga-
tion. See generally Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEo. L.J. 1355
(1991).
380 See PiTKIN, supra note 378, at 113-14.
381 If representation is purely descriptive, the question of the role of the representative has been
answered: the representative simply speaks as an automaton, asserting the interests of the constituent
382 Sturm, Participation, supra note 379, at 1008 ("Instead of offering a substantive standard to
determine who should participate in framing the remedy, the deliberative model establishes a process to
identify the individuals, groups, and organizations whose participation is necessary to develop and im-
plement a fair and workable remedy.").
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erative process. In the administrative decisionmaking process, agency deci-
sionmakers can play the role of facilitating representation.
Ultimately, groups must select representatives "empowered to speak
for the groups they claim to represent, ' 13 although they may do so with the
assistance of a third party.384 Greater weight may be given to underrepre-
sented interests. For example, some communities that have failed to reach
agreement on economic development policies have invited mediators to
help resolve their disputes; one strategy employed by such mediators has
been to devise an alternative government decisionmaking body in which
representatives of city government sit together with newly chosen repre-
sentatives of neighborhoods and businesses and reach consensus over a pe-
riod of months.3 s Although mediation approaches have been criticized for
encouraging the substitution of private interests for the public interest in
agency decisionmaking 38 6 and it can be questioned whether, in practice,
they have resulted in better quality agency decisions,38 7 mediation has
forced decisionmakers to confront the issue of representation in the agency
decisionmaking process.
Unlike mediation approaches, which require some pre-selection of a
discrete number of participants, many extant agency decisionmaking
mechanisms, such as rulemaking and adjudication, do not ordinarily allow
the opportunity for pre-selection. Instead, these mechanisms rely on vol-
untary participation by interests subject to applicable standing limitations.
In a recent circuit court decision, Chief Judge Richard Posner offered an
interesting approach to a similar problem with participation388 in the context
383 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 101 (1987). This involves identifying individuals and
groups directly affected by, responsible, or in a position to block the final decision. Id. at 103.
384 Id.
385 See Lawrence Susskind, The Role of Negotiation in Planning, Lecture at University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, cited in Whittington & MacRae, supra note 365.
386 See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public
Interest-EPA 's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987).
387 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory
Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1210-12, 1219-20 (1994). The regulatory negotiation statute sets
twenty-five as the limit on membership for regulatory negotiations unless the agency argues otherwise.
5 U.S.C. § 565(b) (1994). As Rose-Ackerman suggests, regulatory negotiations do not help participants
acquire scientific or technical information. Rather, they help "clarifyl the interests at stake and helpfl
disparate interests find common ground." Thus, they "cannot succeed unless basic entitlements are clear
and participants can predict what actions the agency will take if no agreement is reached." L at 1211.
38s According to Judge Posner,
[i]nereasing the number of parties to a suit can make the suit unwieldy. Of particular concern, it
can impede settlement. With immaterial exceptions, such as the case of a class member who has
forgone his right to opt out of the class action, a party cannot be forced to settle a case. An inter-
venor acquires the rights of a party. He can continue the litigation even if the party on whose side
he intervened is eager to settle. This blocking right is appropriate if that party cannot be consid-
ered an adequate representative of the intervenor's interests, but not otherwise.
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Corps of Army Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 508 (7th
Cir.1996) (citations omitted).
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of the right to intervention under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.389  To resolve the problem, Judge Posner allowed the party
seeking participation, a citizen group challenging a proposal to build a land-
fill, to file a conditional or standby application for leave to intervene at the
outset of a suit challenging an Army Corps of Engineers denial of a Clean
Water Act section 404 permit.390  The district court, according to Judge
Posner, should then defer the question of adequacy of representation until
the applicant has demonstrated inadequacy.39 Likewise, absent major re-
forms designed to address some of the problems posed by unencumbered
participation, agencies might consider a similar limitation on participation.
Assuming that an agency proceeding is already providing for participation
by an interest identical to an affected would-be participant, an agency might
exercise its discretion 92 to presume adequate representation unless the
would-be participant proves otherwise, while also allowing the would-be
participant to file some sort of standby status for full participation in the
proceeding if necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
[A] major task of any society is to create a social environment in which
self-interest has reason to be enlightened.
393
Modem political theory has consistently erred in favor of enhanced
participation as a solution to the perceived failure of government. The ide-
als embraced by modem bureaucratic deliberative democrats attempt to
make the agency decisionmaking process something more than rational jar-
gon or confrontational exchange politics. However, the examples of citizen
suits, NEPA's EIS process, and sunshine laws illustrate how some types of
participation, if not tempered, may defeat the goals of administrative proc-
ess. Participation may also cause deliberative decisionmaking, particularly
389 Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confers a right of intervention upon a
person who "claims an interest relating to" the subject matter of the suit in which the person wants to
intervene, provided that the disposition of the suit might "impair or impede" the person's ability to pro-
tect that interest and the interest is not "adequately represented" by a party to the suit. lad at 505.
390 33 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
391 In that case, the interests of the Army Corps of Engineers and the intervenor were identical,
leading the court to presume adequacy. Solid Waste, 101 F.3d at 508.
392 An agency is most likely to have such discretion in the adjudicative context In the rulemak-
ing context, agencies are required by the APA to give "interested persons" an opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). Thus, full implementation of an approach similar to Judge
Posner's in agency rulemaking, as well as in the context of citizen suits, the EIS process, or sunshine
laws, would require statutory reforms. On appeal of agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 702, however,
courts may have considerable leeway to implement such limitations in the application of traditional
standing analysis, as Judge Posner did in Solid Waste.
393 SIMoN, supra note 123, at 105.
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as encouraged by deliberative democracy, to lapse into expertocratic or plu-
ralist decisionmaking cultures.
Such mechanisms, it would seem, should be a part of contemporary
discussions aimed at reforming the administrative process. For example,
Congress should consider enhancing agency discretion to supervise en-
forcement and policymaking agendas, rather than encourage private inter-
ests dissatisfied with agency decisions to bypass the administrative process
and sue in court. While efforts to enhance the amount of information avail-
able to agency decisionmakers and participants, such as NEPA's EIS proc-
ess, are well intentioned, Congress should proceed cautiously before
imposing rigorous public participation and information-gathering require-
ments as a part of cost or risk assessment mandates. In addition, Congress
should take seriously the problems the Sunshine Act poses for multi-
member agencies and consider adopting a provision that will allow pre-
decisional deliberations outside of the sunshine or closed discussions so
long as an agency has publicly deliberated about the necessity of a closed
meeting. Agency approaches to managing participation can often be under-
stood as enhancing, not diminishing, the quality and democracy of their de-
cisionmaking processes.
The point of this entire exercise has been to explore whether, in any
circumstances, we might justify regulating, instead of blindly increasing,
participation in agency decisionmaking. Balanced participation may pro-
vide hope for improving ordinary deliberative democratic decisionmaking
by restoring agency control over agendas, increasing accountability and
neutrality. It may increase the quality of decisionmakers' analysis of in-
formation and discourage strategic uses of information by participants. Fi-
nally, it may encourage collegial decisionmaking in multi-member
agencies. Moreover, regulation of participation may also help to ensure that
decisionmakers, as an institutional matter, do not select a sub-optimal deci-
sionmaking culture.
Limiting participation alone will not necessarily make agency deci-
sionmaking more deliberative if it also works to exclude perspectives that
do not have representation in the administrative process. However, al-
though for many individuals and interest groups too little meaningful par-
ticipation currently occurs,39 4 this should not justify embracing broad
participatory reforms for those who already participate actively in agency
decisions. Limitations on participation, by contrast, will likely jump start a
discussion about who represents whom in the administrative process. To
the extent that this forces a shift in emphasis towards the issue of represen-
tation, it holds promise to make administrative procedure more democratic
than blindly embracing participation.
394 See Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997) (arguing that delib-
eration requires equality of opportunity to articulate persuasive arguments and the capacity to evoke ac-
knowledgement of one's arguments, to the disadvantage of women and minorities in practice).
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On the other hand, to the extent that we feel uneasy regulating partici-
pation in bureaucratic decisionmaking, another option exists: re-evaluate
deliberative democracy as an account of bureaucracy. But, even a re-
evaluation of deliberative democracy as a theory of administrative law must
address whether we can have anything at all approaching democracy in
agency governance absent deliberation.
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